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Abstract
This thesis describes the development and deployment of honeypot systems to mea-
sure real-world cybercriminal activity in online accounts. Compromised accounts ex-
pose users to serious threats including information theft and abuse. By analysing the
modus operandi of criminals that compromise and abuse online accounts, we aim
to provide insights that will be useful in the development of mitigation techniques.
We explore account compromise and abuse across multiple online platforms that
host webmail, social, and cloud document accounts. First, we design and create re-
alistic decoy accounts (honeypots) and build covert infrastructure to monitor activity
in them. Next, we leak credentials of those accounts online to lure miscreants to the
accounts. Finally, we record and analyse the resulting activity in the compromised
accounts.
Our top three findings on what happens after online accounts are attacked can
be summarised as follows. First, attackers that know the locations of webmail ac-
count owners tend to connect from places that are closer to those locations. Second,
we show that demographic attributes of social accounts influence how cybercrimi-
nals interact with them. Third, in cloud documents, we show that document content
influences the activity of cybercriminals. We have released a tool for setting up web-
mail honeypots to help other researchers that may be interested in setting up their
own honeypots.
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Impact Statement
It is hard for researchers to study what happens to online accounts during illicit ac-
cesses unless such researchers are in control of a large online service. The resulting
research gap inspired us to develop new ways to make it possible for researchers to
carry out such studies. To this end, we designed, developed, and deployed honey-
pot systems across various online services. Our approach enables us to obtain and
analyse primary data from compromised accounts, and will help other researchers
to achieve similar results.
It is important for defenders to understand the behaviour of attackers at all times
to keep defence mechanisms up to date. In view of this, it is possible to commer-
cialise our work by building custom honeypot services for organisations that wish to
protect their online assets from cybercriminals. Such honeypot systems will be de-
ployed along with “tripwire” mechanisms to raise alerts when criminals gain access
to privileged information. These systems would provide useful real-time information
about attacker behaviour and such information can be used to train and improve de-
tection and mitigation systems. Similar to our approach, CounterCraft, a European
company, has built a commercial “Cyber Deception Platform” that deploys decoy on-
line assets (for instance, virtual machines, documents, and mobile apps) to deceive
attackers and collect valuable threat intelligence and protect organisations.1 This
shows that our honeypots indeed possess potential commercial value.
We have disseminated some of our findings to the security community. In other
words, we presented peer-reviewed papers at international conferences, workshops,
symposia, and invited talks (including a 2016 guest lecture in UCL’s Crime Science
1https://www.countercraft.eu/
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MSc programme). In addition to expanding the security community’s knowledge of
malicious activity, we also released an open-source tool for deploying webmail hon-
eypots,2 which researchers in Utrecht University (the Netherlands) are now using to
carry out further research. These demonstrate the growing impact of our work on
the academic community, in terms of contributions to practical knowledge and tools
to make online activity safer for everyone.
Outside academic circles, the general public has benefited from our work via
considerable press coverage by BBC News3 and other news outlets. This has
helped to raise public awareness about what happens to compromised accounts and
ways to stay safe online. In 2016, the author presented our work at the UK Home
Office (the government department responsible for security). Similarly, the author
presented our work to industry experts, government agencies, and academics at
the 2017 Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security Research conference
in Nottingham (UK). Finally, our work on social honeypots has won a “Secure the
Internet” grant from Facebook.4 Our work on webmail honeypots was a finalist in
the 2017 Europe Cyber Security Awareness Week in Valence (France). Once again,
these demonstrate the impact of our work on various sectors outside academia, to-
wards solving real-world problems and engaging with the general public to reduce
cybercrime.
2https://bitbucket.org/gianluca_students/gmail-honeypot
3https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37510501
4https://research.fb.com/facebook-awards-more-than-800000-in-secure-the-internet-
grants/
6
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Gianluca Stringhini, for his
mentorship in research and scholarly work. I deeply appreciate his friendly guid-
ance, leadership by example, and timely provision of research resources throughout
my PhD programme. I also thank my second supervisor, Emiliano De Cristofaro, for
ensuring that my research journey progressed as planned.
I am thankful to my coauthors in UCL (London), Telefonica I+D (Barcelona), and
other research institutions around the world, for demonstrating true scholarly collab-
oration. I am also grateful to my collaborators in Google and Facebook. Their help
and advice enabled me to scale up experiments and minimise problems that would
have emerged otherwise.
My research journey would have been boring without my colleagues in the UCL
Information Security research group. I would like to thank them for bringing excite-
ment to the journey. I will miss the table football matches and other social activities
we enjoyed together. They also gave advice on my manuscripts and presentations.
I would like to say thanks to staff and students of the UCL Computer Science de-
partment for their support throughout my PhD journey in UCL.
Many thanks to the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (Nigeria) for spon-
soring my research work and taking care of my living expenses in the UK.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support and encouragement on
this journey — they made sure I did not walk alone. To everyone else not mentioned
here, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to them.
7
List of Figures
2.1 Sensitive information in webmail accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Honeypot development life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Webmail honeypot infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Access types per leak outlet (webmail accounts) . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Duration of unique accesses (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Time difference between first leak and first visit (CDF) . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5 Timeline of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.6 Distribution of browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.7 Distribution of operating systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.8 UK login locations (geographical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.9 US login locations (geographical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.1 Profile header of a whitehat account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Facebook’s whitehat dashboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3 Example uncompressed DYI archive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4 Social honeypot infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5 Defective honey account example (social) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6 Time difference between first leak and first login (CDF) . . . . . . . . . 98
5.7 Duration of accesses per activity type (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.8 Duration of accesses per age range (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.9 Duration of accesses per gender (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.10 Types of accesses per age range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8
5.11 Types of accesses per gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.12 Received friend requests per age and gender (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.13 Origins of accesses (geographical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.1 Google Sheets sharing configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 Honey bank sheet (payroll) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.3 Honey Bitcoin sheet (payroll) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.4 Cloud document honeypot infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.5 Time difference between leak and first access (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.6 Timeline of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.7 Link clicks (CDF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.8 Origins of clicks on honey URLs (geographical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.9 Distribution of browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.10 Distribution of operating systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
9
List of Tables
3.1 Additional system requirements to build honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 Groups of honey webmail accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.2 Leak outlets (webmail accounts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Search activity: top words (webmail accounts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.1 Leak outlets (social accounts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2 Summary of actions (social accounts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 Statistical tests on access durations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.4 Search bar: top words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5 Chatty content: top words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.6 Distribution of browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.7 Distribution of operating systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.1 Examples of honey URLs (in cloud documents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Leak outlets (cloud documents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3 Clicks on honey URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
10
Contents
1 Introduction 16
1.1 Thesis statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Peer-reviewed papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Scope of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Thesis outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Literature Review 23
2.1 Stealing online accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 Via botnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.2 Via data breaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3 Via account hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 Misuse and abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.1 Information theft and misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.2 Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.3 Scams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2.4 Cyberbullying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Detecting malicious activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.1 Understanding manual hijacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Understanding spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.3 Defeating information theft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Honeypot boulevard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.1 What is a honeypot? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11
2.4.2 Selected honeypot studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.3 Honeypots in politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Research problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Honey Assets Method 38
3.1 Criminals, visitors, or both? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 System requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Target population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4 Honeypot development life cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Potential alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Limitations of the honey assets method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7 Additional requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Hijacked Webmail Accounts 49
4.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.1 Gmail accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3.2 Google Apps Script . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.4 Method and experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.1 Honey accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.2 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4.3 Experiment setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4.4 Threats to validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.5 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5.1 Activity overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5.2 Taxonomy of account accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5.3 Timing of activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.5.4 System configuration of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12
4.5.5 On the origins of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.6 The gold digger’s quest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.7 Sophistication of attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Interesting case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5 Stolen Social Accounts 82
5.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.3.1 Facebook accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3.2 Whitehat accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3.3 Download Your Information (DYI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.4 Method and experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.1 Setting up honey accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.2 Data collection infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4.3 Leaking honey credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.4.4 Threats to validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4.5 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.5 Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.5.1 Discarding defective accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5.2 Accesses and associated actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.5.3 Taxonomy of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.5.4 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.5.5 Timing of account activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.5.6 Further demographic analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5.7 What gold diggers seek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.5.8 (Anti)social chatter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5.9 System configuration of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5.10 On the origins of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
13
5.6 Interesting case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6 Compromised Cloud Documents 110
6.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.3 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3.1 Cloud documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.3.2 Google Sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.4 Method and experimental setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.4.1 Creating honey sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.4.2 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.4.3 Leaking long links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.4.4 Threats to validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4.5 Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.5 Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.5.1 Activity overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.5.2 What is a sheet access? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.5.3 Timing of activity in sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.5.4 Modifications and edits in sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.5.5 Click activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.5.6 System configuration of accesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7 Discussions and Conclusion 136
7.1 Implications for detection systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.2 Differences across services under study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.3 Common trends across services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
7.4 Lessons learned from dissemination vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.5 Implementation-specific limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.6 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
14
7.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
15
Chapter 1
Introduction
“Hardware is easy to protect: Lock it in a room, chain it to a desk, or buy a
spare. Information poses more of a problem. It can exist in more than one
place; be transported halfway across the planet in seconds; and be stolen
without your knowledge.”
– Bruce Schneier
Total global spending on cybersecurity from 2017 to 2021 will likely exceed 1
trillion dollars, according to a 2018 report by Cybersecurity Ventures.1 This shows
the massive impact (and cost) of cybercrime on organisations and individuals alike.
A 2014 study revealed that unauthorised parties had gained access to online ac-
counts that belonged to 30% of participants [85]. Recent colossal data breaches
further highlight the magnitude of cybercrime and its effects — these incidents in-
clude Yahoo (3 billion compromised accounts), Adult Friend Finder (412.2 million
compromised accounts), and eBay (145 million compromised accounts).2
Malicious online activity perpetrated by cybercriminals include email spamming [48],
malware dissemination [26, 1], phishing [47], information theft [25, 90], social spam-
ming [45, 93, 108, 98], unauthorised crawling [57], account hijacking [25, 41] and
Denial-of-Service attacks (DOS) [9], among others. To facilitate such activity, cyber-
criminals rely on an underground ecosystem of interconnected merchants trading
1https://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-market-report/
2https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-
of-the-21st-century.html
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fake and compromised accounts, botmasters in control of massive botnet infrastruc-
ture, malware developers and distributors, and other actors [92, 98, 26]. To mitigate
malicious online activity, it is important to disrupt the operations of the underground
ecosystem. This requires a deep understanding of that ecosystem.
It is difficult to study the activity of criminals that specialise in stealing and selling
online accounts, without being in charge of an online service, for instance, Google
or Facebook. In other words, it is difficult for researchers to gain access to private
compromised accounts to study the behaviour of criminals in them. Hence, there is
limited research literature in this space (in Chapter 2, we discuss this in detail). The
rare exceptions are studies that analysed publicly available account information, for
instance, posts made on Twitter by compromised accounts [41, 42].
To close this research gap, we develop new ways and infrastructure (honeypot
systems) to study compromised accounts without being in control of the online ser-
vices that host them. We focus on hijacked webmail accounts, social accounts,
and cloud documents. To this end, we construct realistic decoy accounts and doc-
uments, which we refer to as honey assets (honey accounts or honey documents).
We deploy those honey assets, record accesses to them using our honeypot in-
frastructure, analyse the resulting data, and draw inferences on malicious activity in
compromised accounts. By relying on honey assets instead of real accounts that
belong to real users, we ensure that no harm happens to anyone during our experi-
ments. We discuss ethical considerations in more detail in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.5),
Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.5), and Chapter 6 (Section 6.4.5) respectively.
In this thesis, we present multiple findings that provide the research community
with a better understanding of what happens when online accounts are attacked. For
instance, we discovered that attackers that know the locations of webmail account
owners tend to connect from places that are closer to those locations. We infer that
this is an attempt to evade current security mechanisms employed by online ser-
vices to discover suspicious logins. Also, in webmail and social accounts, search
terms revealed that behavioural modelling could work in identifying anomalous be-
haviour in online accounts. In webmail accounts, we observed that search terms
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mostly contained financial/sensitive information while search terms recorded in so-
cial accounts indicated less interest in financial information. In cloud documents, we
discovered that the activity of cybercriminals varied, depending on sheet content.
For instance, we recorded more modifications in sheets containing cryptocurrency
information than sheets containing traditional banking information.
Other observations in Chapters 4 (webmail accounts), 5 (social accounts), and 6
(cloud documents) include activity timing, modifications made to online assets, and
differences in account activity depending on demographic attributes of online ac-
counts, among others. In Chapter 7, we discuss the implications of those findings.
Our work contributes to the security community by shining light on the activity
of cybercriminals and providing new ways to study compromised online accounts.
We discuss existing research literature, point out research gaps, and present our
honeypot approach to studying online accounts. We also describe our experiments,
present our findings and what they imply, and highlight what remains to be done.
We are hopeful that this work will provide new insights, tools, and techniques for
online service providers, fellow researchers, and other parties seeking to mitigate
cybercrime and make online activity safer for everyone.
1.1 Thesis statement
There is limited research work on activity within online accounts after criminals gain
access to them. This is because it is hard to study online accounts without being
in control of a large online service (say Facebook or Gmail), with the exception of
publicly available account data (for instance, Twitter). Through the lenses of hon-
eypots, we can provide a deeper understanding of what happens to such accounts,
provide tools and techniques for researchers to carry out further studies, and bridge
the existing research gap. Our findings will also provide insights that can be used to
improve detection and mitigation systems that protect online users from cybercrimi-
nals.
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1.2 Contributions
Overall, this thesis makes the following contributions:
• To achieve the goal of understanding malicious activity in online accounts, we
propose a systems-based life cycle approach to the development and deploy-
ment of honeypots, and identify a set of minimum requirements, with careful
consideration for research ethics to avoid harming people.
• We design and develop a system to monitor activity in Gmail accounts towards
understanding malicious activity in compromised webmail accounts. We pub-
licly release the source code of our system3 to allow other researchers to
deploy their own Gmail accounts for related studies. To the best of our knowl-
edge, it is the first publicly available Gmail honeypot infrastructure.
• We design and develop another system to instrument and monitor compro-
mised social accounts on Facebook, and perform large-scale experiments to
observe differences in account activity per demographic attributes of the ac-
counts.
• We introduce some improvements to the cloud document monitor system orig-
inally proposed in a 2016 USENIX workshop paper [62]. To understand what
happens to compromised cloud documents, we then create and deploy Google
spreadsheets containing fake banking records and cryptocurrency information
(fake financial details).
• We present detailed analysis of activity in compromised webmail accounts,
social accounts, and cloud documents. We also discuss the implications of
our findings, especially for online services seeking to improve their detection
and mitigation techniques and systems.
Parts of the work in this thesis have been peer-reviewed and presented in top
conferences and workshops. In addition, some parts have received considerable
3https://bitbucket.org/gianluca_students/gmail-honeypot
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press coverage on BBC News,4 Huffington Post,5 and The State of Security,6 among
other news outlets. This shows that our work has contributed to the research com-
munity and increased the awareness of the general public about compromised on-
line accounts. Overall, this will lead to safer online activity for everyone.
1.3 Peer-reviewed papers
As we previously mentioned, parts of the work in this thesis have been published in
peer-reviewed conferences and workshops, in collaboration with other researchers.
Some aspects of our honeypot infrastructure and findings appear in the following
papers.
• Adrian Bermudez Villalva, Jeremiah Onaolapo, Gianluca Stringhini, Mirco Mu-
solesi. Under and over the surface: a comparison of the use of leaked account
credentials in the Dark and Surface Web. In Crime Science (Journal), 2018.
• Emeric Bernard-Jones, Jeremiah Onaolapo, and Gianluca Stringhini. BABEL-
TOWER: How Language Affects Criminal Activity in Stolen Webmail Accounts.
In Companion Proceedings of The Web Conference (WWW), 2018.
• Jeremiah Onaolapo, Enrico Mariconti, and Gianluca Stringhini. What Happens
After You Are Pwnd: Understanding the Use of Leaked Webmail Credentials
in the Wild. In ACM Internet Measurement Conference(IMC), 2016.
• Martin Lazarov, Jeremiah Onaolapo, and Gianluca Stringhini. Honey Sheets:
What Happens to Leaked Google Spreadsheets? In USENIX Workshop on
Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET), 2016.
Collaborators. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we mention our academic and non-academic
collaborators, and acknowledge their contributions in detail.
4https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37510501
5https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/what-hackers-actually-do-with-your-
stolen-personal-information_uk_58049f32e4b0e982146cd18f
6https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/heres-what-
happens-after-your-webmail-account-is-compromised/
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1.4 Scope of work
In this thesis, our scope of work encompasses studying malicious activity within
compromised assets (with specific focus on online accounts and cloud documents)
to shed light on the modus operandi of criminals that connect to stolen accounts.
Our work does not directly study sales of stolen information (products and prices),
or activity that is external to the accounts under study. Those topics are outside
the scope of this work. Although we discuss possible ways to apply our findings
to the development of better automatic detection and mitigation systems, specific
implementations of such systems (machine learning approaches, for instance) are
outside the scope of this work. Instead, we focus on exploring new ways and sys-
tems to study malicious activity in online accounts.
1.5 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss ways
through which criminals steal online accounts, how they misuse the stolen accounts,
and victimise online users. We also discuss existing research literature, identify re-
search gaps, and discuss the justification for our research approach (honeypots).
Chapter 3, which strongly interconnects the remaining chapters, provides a high-
level discussion of our honeypot approach, with focus on minimum requirements
and our honeypot development life cycle. We also discuss merits and limitations of
our approach, in addition to alternative methods. The next three chapters build on
the approach proposed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents our Gmail honeypot. It
also describes our experiments on compromised Gmail accounts and resulting find-
ings. Similarly, Chapter 5 presents our large-scale Facebook honeypot, experiments
on compromised social accounts, and our resulting findings. Chapter 6 presents our
cloud document honeypot, experiments on compromised cloud spreadsheets, and
our findings. Finally, in Chapter 7, we discuss the implications of our findings and
suggest ways to improve existing detection and mitigation systems of online ser-
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vices. We also discuss implementation-specific limitations of our honeypots and
potential future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we explain various ways by which cybercriminals gain illegitimate
access to online accounts and misuse them. We also discuss how to detect such
malicious activity. Finally, we explore the role of decoy accounts in understanding
what happens to compromised accounts.
2.1 Stealing online accounts
Cybercriminals can gain access to online accounts using various methods and tools.
These include botnets, data breaches, and account hijacking. We will focus on them
since they are particularly relevant to the work in this thesis.
2.1.1 Via botnets
A botnet is a huge network of compromised computers (also known as bots) that
receive instructions from one or more Command-and-Control (C&C) servers under
the control of a botmaster [90]. The legitimate administrators and users of such
compromised computers are usually oblivious to the fact that their machines have
become members of the bot network. Botnets are often used to send spam [59]
and steal sensitive information in bulk, for instance, online banking credentials [19].
Cybercriminals also use botnets to stage Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) at-
tacks on victims’ network infrastructure, as seen in the 2016 Mirai DDoS attack on
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Brian Krebs’ cybersecurity blog.1 Common means by which vulnerable machines
are “enlisted” into botnets include drive-by downloads [67] and malware delivered
through phishing or spam emails [1]. Communication links between bots and C&C
servers are usually established via IRC, HTTP, or P2P channels, depending on the
organisation of the botnet [90]. Bots are not always desktop or laptop computers —
social accounts [21] and IoT devices [9] can be enlisted as bots as well.
A socialbot is software that masquerades as a real user in an Online Social Net-
work (OSN) [21]. Socialbots post messages, upload content, and send connection
requests to other accounts on OSNs. Similar to the traditional botnets explained
earlier, socialbots are also controlled by botmasters. When socialbots infiltrate so-
cial graphs of unsuspecting victims, they have the ability to harvest personal data of
their victims (by scraping their profile pages) [21]. Such valuable data can be used
or sold by the botmaster for further nefarious operations, including spamming [44],
phishing [93], and identity theft [18]. Socialbots have allegedly been involved in at-
tempts to sway elections2 and dissemination of fake news [113, 111, 112]. These
show that socialbots, like traditional botnets, have the capacity to inflict substantial
harm on victims.
Existing botnet mitigation techniques include infiltration and hijacking [90] which
enable defenders to learn about and take over botnet communications, towards dis-
rupting the cybercriminal operation(s) behind the botnet. Both mitigation techniques
are costly and time-limited in the face of advanced botnets, since they usually involve
reverse engineering malware binaries and communication protocols [90]. These are
non-trivial tasks, and botnets continually evolve in ways that defeat existing counter-
measures.
2.1.2 Via data breaches
Another way through which cybercriminals compromise online accounts is by mount-
ing information-stealing attacks on vulnerable servers and terminals, often resulting
1https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/krebsonsecurity-hit-with-record-ddos/
2http://uk.businessinsider.com/twitter-russia-facebook-election-accounts-2017-10
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in massive data breaches. The techniques they employ include SQL injection [46],
password guessing [103], and social engineering attacks [37], for instance, by trick-
ing employees of the target organisation to give up their authentication credentials.
Recent massive data breaches include Yahoo (3 billion compromised accounts),
Adult Friend Finder (412.2 million compromised accounts), and eBay (145 million
compromised accounts) incidents.3 Given the scale, severity, and frequency of data
breaches in recent times, it is important for the security community to find lasting
solutions to this ongoing problem. This constitutes the primary motivation for the
work in this thesis towards understanding what cybercriminals do with stolen online
accounts. In other words, since data breaches cannot be completely mitigated yet,
it is important for the security community to understand what cybercriminals do with
stolen accounts, post-compromise, to help develop better detection and mitigation
systems.
Data breaches are often compounded by the problem of password reuse across
various online services [35]. Also, as the security community knows quite well,
strong passwords place heavy burdens on users and this leads to usability issues [55,
66]. This has brought about a situation in which users often opt for memorable
but weak passwords to secure their accounts. The combined problem of password
reuse and weak passwords makes it easy for criminals to breach accounts across
multiple services, even the ones that did not suffer direct data breaches. Exist-
ing countermeasures include cryptographic hashing [80], password managers [86],
multi-factor authentication [32], public-key authentication [81], and proximity authen-
tication [88].
2.1.3 Via account hijacking
As explained earlier, online accounts are valuable resources and are attractive tar-
gets in the eyes of cybercriminals. They hijack accounts to gain access to the wealth
of information stored in them. Webmail accounts, for instance, often become “hubs”
3https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-
of-the-21st-century.html
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that accumulate sensitive information like credit card details, password reset infor-
mation, and government identification documents, as a result of regular everyday
use (see Figure 2.1). The immediate implication is that a successful attack on a
webmail account can lead to a chain of further attacks on other accounts linked to
that webmail account.
Automated hijacking is usually carried out using botnets (as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.1), while manual hijacking is facilitated mostly by low-volume spearphishing
attacks on unsuspecting victims [25]. When manual hijacking attacks succeed, the
cybercriminal usually performs a quick assessment of the stolen accounts to de-
termine their value and decide what to do with them — usually to sell the account
credentials in an underground market or discard them, depending on the perceived
value of each account. Hijacked accounts can also be used to send spam and phish-
ing messages to exploit the existing trust between the victim and their contacts. This
is because spam filters are more likely to allow messages from known contacts to
pass through them [41, 25].
According to Bursztein et al. [25], detecting manual hijacking activity is more dif-
ficult than detecting automated hijacking activity. This is because manual hijacking
is a low-volume activity and manual hijackers mimic normal users. Thus, it is diffi-
cult to tune error rates of automatic detection systems to discover manual hijacking
incidents. In addition, manual hijackers are usually skilful enough to know how to
evade detection. In Chapter 4, we show this in detail. It further highlights the need to
study the modus operandi of manual hijackers closely — this is the main motivation
underpinning our work.
2.2 Misuse and abuse
We have discussed how cybercriminals perpetrate information theft via botnets, data
breaches, and manual hijacking, and how they harm victims. In this section, we dis-
cuss ways by which cybercriminals misuse online accounts and abuse their victims.
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Webmail
accounts
Bank account 
details
Password reset 
information
Cloud storage 
links
Other 
auth tokens
Additional 
sensitive info
Figure 2.1: Webmail accounts, like most types of online accounts, accumulate sen-
sitive information with regular use. This sensitive information attracts cybercriminals
seeking to steal and monetise sensitive personal information.
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2.2.1 Information theft and misuse
As we mentioned earlier, criminals leverage botnet infrastructure or mount phishing
attacks [47] to steal sensitive information from victims. For instance, the Zeus mal-
ware family (also known as Zbot) [19] steals login credentials and sends them to
C&C servers. Other information-stealing malware include Corebot and Dridex. As
of 2015, Dridex likely brought about losses amounting to 100 million dollars world-
wide.4 This shows the magnitude of harm that results from information theft and
highlights the importance of further studies in this space, to mitigate harm. After
stealing sensitive information from victims, cybercriminals stockpile that information
for later use, or sell it via dark markets [31], underground forums [69], and paste
sites, among other outlets. Illicit uses of stolen information include spamming (for
instance, using stolen authentication credentials), spearphishing attacks [94] (aided
by knowledge of private information), and blackmail attacks,5 among others.
2.2.2 Spam
Spam, which can be defined as unsolicited messaging, is a problem that has plagued
online services for a long time, including but not limited to webmail services [39] and
social networks [93]. These services attract many users and collect huge quan-
tities of personal and sensitive data, as we explained in Section 2.1.3. This, in
turn, attracts cybercriminals seeking treasure troves of sensitive data. To gain illicit
access to this treasure, they leverage botnets to send bulk unsolicited messages
(spam) usually containing malicious payloads to unsuspecting victims. Sometimes,
they send targeted malicious messages, for instance, during spearphishing attacks.
However, not all spam messages contain malicious payloads — some contain be-
nign newsletters, marketing offers, and other information from non-malicious enti-
ties. Spam distribution results in substantial earnings for cybercriminals — on the
other hand, spam prevention efforts by the security community are disproportion-
4https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/13/nca-in-safety-warning-after-
millions-stolen-from-uk-bank-accounts
5https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/
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ately costly, according to a 2013 study by Anderson et al. [7].
2.2.3 Scams
The main motive of cybercriminals has shifted from mischief and fun to financial
gain [53]. One of the ways by which cybercriminals obtain such illicit gain is by
scamming unsuspecting victims. This brings the infamous 419 scams to mind. A
419 scam is any scheme designed to fleece people of their money, as defined in
Section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code [100]. A classic 419 scam starts with
a message from a scammer to the potential victim, usually describing immense
wealth (fictional) that would purportedly benefit the victim. Once the scammer gains
the trust of the potential victim, the scammer asks the victim to pay a “small” fee to
process a big “reward.” When the victim pays the fee, then the scam is complete.
The scammer will not communicate with the victim anymore. Even if the scammer
resumes communication, it will usually be an attempt to coax the victim into sending
more money [40]. These operations are mostly carried out manually and often rely
on the victim’s greed or pity to succeed [56].
Apart from 419 scams, there are other popular variants of online scams, includ-
ing dating scams or romance scams that leverage dating websites. Cybercriminals
target them, set up fake profiles, and seduce vulnerable users seeking companion-
ship [107]. When they gain the trust of their victims, the scammers make demands
for funds to handle spurious matters, including visa processing and flight tickets.
Some scammers request expensive flower baskets [52].
Scam letters were initially sent via snail mail (post) long before the era of the
Internet. With the proliferation of electronic communication via the Internet, 419
scam messages are now sent en masse to potential victims via email and fax [40].
Online scams cause heavy financial and psychological losses to victims, and are
not fully understood yet [52, 68].
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2.2.4 Cyberbullying
Social networks have evolved from online venues where users connect with friends,
loved ones, and strangers alike, to colossal platforms and ecosystems comprising
marketplaces, news outlets, and much more. Users spend a lot of time interacting
on these platforms. Some users make a living from their presence on social net-
works, for instance, Instagram celebrities with millions of followers. However, social
networks are also known to attract toxic behaviour and cyberbullying.
Previous studies have investigated the roles of cyberbullies, victims, bystanders,
and how they interact [4, 11, 38]. Other studies explored the detection of cyber-
bullying in social networks [72, 71, 73], toxic online forums [17, 50] and gaming
communities [20]. The effect of anonymity on toxic online behaviour has also been
investigated [17, 51, 77]. It is important to note that toxic behaviour is not contained
within toxic online communities. For instance, there is evidence that coordinated
attacks originate from 4chan.org (an online forum) towards users of other services.
Hine et al. [50] studied this problem and proposed an algorithm to detect such coor-
dinated attacks.
2.3 Detecting malicious activity
The problem of malicious activity in online accounts has generated a lot of interest
in the research community. In this section, we review key studies that focus on the
detection and mitigation of malicious activity in online accounts.
2.3.1 Understanding manual hijacking
Bursztein et al. [25] investigated manual hijacking of accounts rather than automatic
hijacking by botnets. They show that manual hijacking is not common, and demon-
strate that phishing is the primary method that manual hijackers use to acquire user
credentials. The study illustrates the importance of decoy account credentials in un-
derstanding malicious activity. Other studies have also leveraged decoy credentials
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and fake documents to study malicious activity [36, 62], and we discuss them further
in Section 2.4.
Cybercriminals prefer to operate from compromised accounts (rather than fake
accounts) since malicious activity is harder to detect in compromised accounts that
belong to real users. Egele et al. [41] presented COMPA, a tool that detects mali-
cious activity in online social networks by building statistical models of normal be-
havioural patterns of users. Deviations from such behaviour can then be used to
detect compromised accounts.
Similarly, Stringhini et al. [94] developed a tool for the detection of spearphishing
attacks based on behavioural modelling of senders. The tool looks out for anoma-
lous email sending behaviour and writing habits, rather than checking the email con-
tent for suspicious words like traditional spam filters do. To understand the phishing
ecosystem, Han et al. [47] deployed sandboxed phishing kits, recorded live interac-
tions of various parties with the kits, and shed light on the phishing life cycle.
2.3.2 Understanding spam
Thomas et al. [99] studied Twitter accounts under the control of spammers. They
discussed the modes of operation of cybercriminals that disseminate spam. They
also reported that the majority of spam accounts rely on unsolicited mentions and
hashtags to reach audiences that are wider than their limited social connections. In
addition, they identified an emerging ecosystem of social spamming services (in-
cluding affiliate programmes). However, the study did not propose detection mech-
anisms to discover the operations of spammers, despite pointing out that the un-
derground spamming ecosystem is largely undisturbed by Twitter’s current defence
mechanisms. Stringhini et al. [93] studied social spam using 900 honeypot pro-
files and presented a tool for spam detection on Facebook and Twitter. In addi-
tion, [106, 21, 63, 13, 98] studied the problem of social spam and [14] applied ma-
chine learning techniques to distinguish legitimate users from video spammers and
content promoters on YouTube, a popular online video social network.
Similarly, Stringhini et al. [92] studied the email spam ecosystem by advertising
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unique honeypot email addresses on the web. The study described the relationships
among various actors in the spam landscape (deduced from statistical correlation),
namely email harvesters, spammers, and botmasters. Stone-Gross et al. [91] stud-
ied a large-scale spam operation by analysing 16 C&C servers of Pushdo/Cutwail
botnet. Other studies in email spam literature explored network-level spam detec-
tion approaches [48], statistical/machine-learning approaches [83, 39, 95], and the
underground ecosystem that drives spam [91].
Detecting fake accounts. Fake accounts play a major role in the problem of spam.
Wang et al. [104] proposed the use of patterns of click events to spot fake accounts,
otherwise known as Sybils, in online services by building clickstream models of real
users and fake accounts. They trained machine learning tools to spot fake accounts
based on those clickstream models. Yang et al. [109] and Cao et al. [27] also pro-
posed ways to uncover fake accounts on social networks.
2.3.3 Defeating information theft
Stone-Gross et al. [90] hijacked the Torpig botnet for ten days by taking advantage
of weaknesses in communication protocols of the botnet. Their method of sinkholing
all data sent from bots to the C&C server they hijacked is similar to our approach of
sinkholing all emails sent from honey webmail accounts in Chapter 4. In 2012, Liu et
al. [65] studied content privacy issues in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks by deploying
honey files containing honey account credentials in P2P shared spaces. They mon-
itored download events and concluded that attackers that downloaded the honey
files had malicious intentions to make economic gain from the private data they ob-
tained. They employed a similar approach to ours — in this thesis, we place decoy
account credentials in strategic locations for cybercriminals to find and misuse them.
However, they studied P2P networks while this thesis focuses on online accounts.
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2.4 Honeypot boulevard
In this thesis, we employ honeypots, having observed the importance of well-designed
honeypots in previous work. Hence, instead of exposing real users to malicious ac-
tivity and potentially harming them in the process, we instead set up realistic hon-
eypots and lured cybercriminals to them, to measure malicious activity in the wild.
Next, we present an overview of honeypots and how they have evolved over time.
2.4.1 What is a honeypot?
A honeypot is a resource designed to receive unauthorised interactions. Unlike
other security mechanisms that are designed to keep attackers away from protected
assets, the value of a honeypot lies in its misuse by attackers [87]. Any attempt
to access a honeypot should be considered suspicious [79]. Honeypots can be
physical or virtual. A physical honeypot is a computer with its own IP address, while
virtual honeypots are simulated atop real machines — the TCP/IP stack of the virtual
machine (VM) is designed to appear similar to a real machine [79].
In addition to physical and virtual machines, files and online accounts can also
be deployed as honeypots, as we did in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. A honey file is a
bait file that triggers alarms when accessed, and it masquerades as a normal file
with some inherent value [110]. Honey files are usually positioned in regular user
file spaces, along with bait, for instance, attractive file names like passwords.xls
or account details.txt (to lure attackers). Attacker operations will then be logged
during accesses to honey files [84, 65].
Honeypots have been around for ages. In the 1980s, Stoll [89] tracked down a
German hacker who remotely gained unauthorised access to a computer network at
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). To achieve this, Stoll deployed
a honeypot, among other tools. Similarly, in the 1990s, Cheswick led a hacker on a
wild goose chase by tricking the hacker into believing they had accessed password
files and vulnerable assets on an AT&T gateway machine [28].
Recent honeypots are more advanced. For instance, honeypots have been suc-
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cessfully deployed to study malware in the wild [10, 105], infiltrate botnets [90], and
track social spam [106, 63]. According to Spitzner [87], honeypots can also be used
to mitigate insider threats in organisations. This shows that honeypots are useful in
the study of malicious activity targeting online accounts and users, and it justifies
our use of honeypots.
2.4.2 Selected honeypot studies
Honeypots are usually built to deceive attackers and they can be used to detect
unauthorised access to privileged information, record the behaviour of attackers af-
ter gaining such unauthorised access, or both. In this section, we present a se-
lection of studies that illustrate deception-based techniques and honeypot usage in
prior work.
Virvilis et al. [101] broadly explored deception as a defence approach, compared
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) to insider attackers, and discussed the use of
deception methods to detect sophisticated attackers. Achleitner et al. [2] and Chiang
et al. [29] developed systems to disrupt reconnaissance activity (scanning) originat-
ing from attackers (APTs, for instance) within a network. Bowen et al. [23] proposed
a way to automatically generate and inject decoy network traffic to ensnare and un-
cover eavesdroppers on a computer network. Bowen et al. [24] leveraged decoy
credentials, also known as honeytokens, to “bait and delude” information-stealing
malware to reveal itself. Bercovitch et al. [15] developed HoneyGen, a tool that au-
tomatically generates realistic honeytokens based on rules derived from real tokens.
HoneyGen requires a high-quality input database of real tokens. Bowen et al. [22]
developed a deception system based on decoy documents and decoy credentials, to
discover insider attackers that attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information. They also
formalised a set of properties (requirements) towards the design and implementation
of honeypots.
Vrable et al. [102] built a prototype honeypot system that was able to run tens of
thousands of virtual honeypots on a few physical servers. Alata et al. [5] recorded
and studied the activity of attackers that gained access to a compromised machine
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via Secure Shell (ssh). They tried to distinguish between human attackers and au-
tomated programs by analysing the way attackers entered commands in the ssh
terminal. Chin et al. developed HoneyLab, an infrastructure that allows various enti-
ties to deploy honeypots on shared computing infrastructure [30]. Mulliner et al. [70]
proposed HoneyDroid, an Android-based honeypot that runs on real mobile phone
hardware. Nazario [74] developed a virtual web client honeypot that can carry out
dynamic analysis of JavaScript and Visual Basic Script, among others.
Kedrowitsch et al. [60] explored ways to improve Linux sandboxes for analy-
sis of evasive malware. Barron and Nikiforakis [12] deployed honeypot machines
and observed how system properties of those machines influenced the behaviour
of attackers. Similarly, online accounts can be repurposed to study the operations
of cybercriminals that interact with them. For instance, honeypots based on on-
line accounts have been deployed to study social spam in OSNs [106, 63, 93] and
email spam [92]. DeBlasio et al. [36] studied compromised websites by registering
on those websites using honey webmail accounts. They monitored illegitimate ac-
cesses to the honey accounts that happened as a result of data breaches on those
websites. They observed attackers that leveraged the problem of password reuse
across online services. Other studies also investigated the behaviour of criminals in
compromised webmail and cloud document accounts via honeypots [25, 76, 62].
The vast majority of existing research literature focuses on detecting malicious
accesses, as these studies show, along with the ones mentioned previously in this
chapter. On the other hand, the core of our work in this thesis focuses on analysing
malicious activity, that is, post-compromise attacker behaviour.
2.4.3 Honeypots in politics
During the 2017 presidential campaign in France, the Macron campaign organisa-
tion devised an ingenious way to defeat hackers that sought to compromise their
webmail accounts. The campaign organisation turned their own webmail accounts
into a “tarpit” defence system by pre-stuffing those accounts with useless data (that
is, useless for hackers). Thus, they wasted the resources of hackers that eventu-
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ally breached those accounts.6 This further highlights the validity of the honeypot
approach to studying malicious activity in the wild. Those webmail accounts can be
thought of as “time-wasting” honeypots, since they were deployed to anticipate hack-
ers and waste their time. In contrast, our webmail honeypots (in Chapter 4), which
predate the Macron honeypots, primarily track the actions of criminals in compro-
mised webmail accounts — time wasting is an optional feature.
2.5 Research problem
There are many aspects of cybercrime that are not yet fully understood. We are
particularly interested in this question — what do cybercriminals do with compro-
mised accounts? They are hard to detect by existing automated scanning systems.
As we stated earlier, this is because their interactions are manual and stealthier
than automated activity, due to human intelligence and adaptation [52, 25]. As a re-
sult, cybercriminals appear to be winning the attackers-defenders game since they
continue to make profits while forcing corporations and governments to make huge,
disproportionate investments in security mechanisms [54]. A recent study reports
that “indirect and defence costs” of cybercrime are at least times ten of cybercrimi-
nals’ earnings [7]. To help mitigate the problem, our work focuses on understanding
what cybercriminals do with compromised accounts. Our work will help to reduce
the costs incurred by law enforcement agencies and corporations in the pursuit of
better security, by providing a deeper understanding into the modus operandi of
cybercriminals that attack online accounts.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored the literature on how cybercriminals gain illicit access to
online accounts, and how they abuse and misuse such accounts. We also reviewed
previous work to highlight techniques for detecting and mitigating malicious activity
6https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/08/team_macron_pre_hack_opsec
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in accounts, and noted that it is hard to detect manual hijacking attacks. It is also
hard to study online accounts without being in control of a large online service.
Finally, we described the role of honeypots in understanding malicious activity and
provided a strong basis for our work.
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Chapter 3
Honey Assets Method
In Chapter 2, we discussed previous work on understanding malicious activity in
online accounts and pointed out a research gap. We also presented an overview of
honeypots, how they have been employed in previous work, and why we chose to
rely on honeypots to shed light on activity in compromised online accounts and cloud
documents. We present details of our honey assets method in this chapter. Honey
assets refer to the fake entities that were exposed (intentionally) to cybercriminals
during experiments, for instance, webmail credentials and accounts in Chapter 4,
social credentials and associated accounts in Chapter 5, and finally, cloud docu-
ments and links that point to them in Chapter 6. Our honey assets method forms
a strong link that interconnects those chapters. Later, in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we
present specific honeypot instances based on this approach.
3.1 Criminals, visitors, or both?
Our work involves building and deploying bait resources (honey assets) and ob-
serving accesses and activity in them. Depending on the dissemination vectors
employed to expose credentials of honey assets, it is reasonable to expect a wide
variety of visitors to honey assets, ranging from curious “benign” visitors to the ones
with criminal intentions, for instance, visitors that intend to derive illicit profit from
stolen accounts. This brings the following question to mind: what is the correct ter-
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minology for visitors to honey assets? Even though our work is not a discourse in
legal terminologies, we defer to Section 1 of the UK Computer Misuse Act 19901
which states that a party is guilty if they knowingly attempt to gain unauthorised
access to computer resources (paraphrased). In view of this, all “visitors” that inten-
tionally connect to our honey assets are potential criminals. However, as we stated
previously, there is the possibility that not all parties that connect to our honey assets
have criminal intentions. Hence, we refer to them mostly as “visitors” and sometimes
as “criminals” or “cybercriminals.” Despite this relaxed nomenclature, it is important
to note once again that unauthorised accesses to computer resources are unlawful
and we do not condone such accesses in any way.
A possible alternative point of view to distinguish benign visitors from malicious
visitors is to specify a threshold based on activity level. Visitors that carry out further
actions on honey assets after initially accessing them can be considered to be ma-
licious. For example, visitors that edit payment information on compromised payroll
sheets can be considered to be more malicious than the ones that perform no ac-
tion after accessing such compromised information. However, this approach is not
robust since it is possible that the visitors that perform no action after access have
made copies of the information they gained access to, for later use, while the ones
that carried out actions may have done so out of curiosity. In fact, there might be
visitors with good intentions that will delete sensitive content from the compromised
documents to protect victims (by limiting the exposure of compromised content).
It is therefore obvious that specifying an activity threshold to distinguish benign
visitors from criminals will not work well. Hence, in this thesis, we rely on the UK
Computer Misuse Act 1990, as earlier described, and refer to all parties that ac-
cessed our honey assets as “criminals” or “visitors” (interchangeably).
1https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/contents
39
3.2 System requirements
We identified the following minimum requirements for our honey assets — they have
to be Accessible, Realistic,Measurable, Ethical, and Robust (ARMER).2 We explain
these requirements next.
Accessible. When creating honey assets, it is essential to ensure that they will
be accessible to the intended audience and researcher(s) that will build the required
honey assets. In other words, honey assets are best built and deployed on platforms
that the intended audience (cybercriminals) already has access to, or can gain ac-
cess to, without much hassle. The same applies to the builder of honey assets
(the chosen platform must be accessible to the researcher that intends to carry out
studies using honeypots). Examples of accessible platforms include free webmail,
social, and dating services.
Realistic. For honey assets to be convincing to the target audience, they have
to be designed and built to look similar to real-world examples. For instance, a
honey webmail account, despite being fake, must look like a webmail account that
belongs to a real user (we achieved this in Chapter 4, for instance). It is therefore
important to pay particular attention to the content and presentation of honey assets.
It is necessary to source content for honey assets from data sources that resemble
content from real users. Thus, at a glance, honey assets derived from such content
will appear believable to cybercriminals and other visitors that gain access to the
honey assets. This will help to reduce potential bias that may arise if honey assets
appear to be “weird,” since such weirdness may affect the behaviour of visitors to
them. It is also possible to generate realistic decoy data by leveraging existing tools
built for that purpose, for instance, HoneyGen [15].
Measurable. It is important to create honey assets in a way that the researcher
managing them can easily collect data from them and perform measurements. This
is achievable by relying on a combination of intrinsic tools, for instance, Google
2ARMER is a memorable acronym, nothing more. It has no relation to weaponry.
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Apps Script3 in Gmail accounts (see Chapter 4), and extrinsic tools, for instance,
scripts developed by the researcher to connect to honey assets and record activity
information. Choices and decisions surrounding honey assets depend heavily on
this requirement — it is pointless to build and deploy honey assets if it will be hard or
impossible to collect activity information from them. However, the instrumentation of
decoy assets must be carried out in a “hidden” way so that attackers cannot easily
observe the presence of such instrumentation tools, since honeypots are designed
to deceive attackers into believing they are interacting with real assets.
Ethical. It is necessary to ensure that honey assets are designed, built, and de-
ployed in an ethical manner. The main ethical goal to consider is to ensure minimal
harm to the intended audience for honey assets, for instance, by isolating poten-
tially harmful honeypot environments. For instance, the researcher must keep all
recorded activity data safe and not de-anonymise visitors to honey assets. Also, if
experiments involve running live malware samples (for instance, in Chapter 4), ad-
equate care must be taken to ensure that those malware samples do not harm any
internal or external parties, by following standard practices in malware research [82].
Researchers that build social honeypots should pay particular attention to [34, 97].
It is also important to protect the researcher responsible for honey assets. Honey
assets and honeypot systems must be designed in a way that minimises the possi-
ble harm that researchers may face, for instance, if their identities become known
during experiments. Hence, it is essential to take advantage of Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs) and proxies, and incorporate them in honeypot infrastructure when
necessary. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we further discuss the steps we took to ensure
that our experiments were conducted in an ethical manner.
Robust. Honey assets and honeypot systems, as explored in this thesis, depend
on external platforms to function. For instance, studies on compromised webmail
accounts rely on accounts that are hosted by a webmail service, usually not un-
der the direct control of the researcher studying them. It is therefore necessary to
3https://developers.google.com/apps-script/overview
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build fault-tolerant honeypot systems and honey assets, so that changes in external
entities (webmail services, for instance) will not adversely affect experiments. How-
ever, sometimes it is impossible to build a honeypot that automatically adapts to all
changes in related external entities. The researcher responsible for the honeypot
system and honey assets must be ever ready to make minor changes to the honey-
pot to adapt to changes in such external entities. An example includes adding minor
updates to scripts that track a specific web page in a honey asset, for instance. If
the online service changes some elements of the user interface of that page, the
honeypot researcher will then have to update their script to match those changes.
In summary, it is necessary to build a robust honeypot and pay particular attention
to it during operation, to make minor changes when necessary.
3.3 Target population
Before designing and developing honeypot infrastructure, one of the key considera-
tions to keep in mind is the target population, in other words, the attackers/criminals
under study. It may be beneficial to customise the proposed honeypot infrastructure
to the target population. For instance, basic attackers may require less effort on
the part of the researcher, especially towards ensuring realism in the honey assets,
unlike sophisticated attackers with higher skill levels. This should influence design
choices, including how and where to source data for honey assets. For instance,
should we source high-quality data from related real-world activity4 or “garbage”
data5 from automated tools? Similarly, the target population should be factored into
design decisions on the scale of honey assets that will be deployed to study them
– a handful of hand-curated honey assets or a plethora of mass-generated honey
assets? It is up to the researcher to decide. It is important to note that these design
choices will also influence experimental design (for instance, where, when, and how
to leak honey credentials), and should be carefully analysed in advance.
4Example – we derived some data from real-world messages posted on Twitter in Chapter 5.
5Fake paper generator – https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/archive/scigen/
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Figure 3.1: Our honeypot development life cycle inspired by the classic sys-
tems/software development life cycle (SDLC) [43]. It is important to note that the
steps are not necessarily sequential and iteration may be necessary across steps.
3.4 Honeypot development life cycle
In this section, we present our honeypot development life cycle as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, inspired by the classic systems/software development life cycle (SDLC) [43].
Next, we explain all steps of the honeypot development life cycle. It is important to
note that those steps are not necessarily sequential and iterations may be necessary
across steps. This honeypot development life cycle has been successfully applied
to specific honeypot implementations in peer-reviewed work [76, 62, 16].
System design. This is the initial phase of the honeypot development process.
Following the ARMER requirements in Section 3.2, the honeypot researcher se-
lects honey asset types and hosting platforms. Other factors to consider include the
required scale of experiments, plans towards automation (especially if it is a large-
scale honeypot), and deployment platforms and outlets (for instance, where/how to
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leak honey credentials). This phase, like most phases of the honeypot development
life cycle, requires strict adherence to all ARMER requirements. This is also the
phase during which the researcher draws up detailed plans for experiments (how to
execute them).
Construction of honey assets. This is the phase during which the honeypot re-
searcher builds honey assets that will eventually be leaked to the intended audience,
for instance, webmail or social accounts. The researcher will also populate honey
assets with realistic data, or in the case of honey credentials, choose realistic cre-
dentials.
Safehouse building. Depending on the specific system design, it may be neces-
sary to build an intermediate data store to serve as an anonymous buffer for activity
data that will be recorded in honey assets. We call such an intermediate data store
a safehouse. For example, in Chapters 4 and 6, we created safehouse webmail ac-
counts to serve as buffers during data collection because our honey assets had the
capability to send out emails containing details of activity data, and it was necessary
to collect those emails via entities that were not obviously connected to us (specif-
ically, safehouse webmail accounts with pseudonymous usernames). Afterwards,
we collected activity data from safehouse webmail accounts and processed them
offline.
Construction of monitor. This phase involves the construction of “sensors” in
honey assets to record activity data, and “virtual telescopes,” which are monitor sys-
tems external to honey assets — they connect to honey assets and collect activity
data. Alternatively, sensors may send activity data to telescopes (or a safehouse, as
explained earlier). In this thesis, our sensors and telescopes often comprise suites
of scripts, servers, parsers, and offline data storage. We explain them in detail in the
following chapters.
System testing. When honey assets and monitor infrastructure are ready, the hon-
eypot researcher has to test them in a controlled environment to ensure that all com-
ponents work as planned, and that the entire honeypot pipeline runs as expected.
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It might be necessary to make some adjustments during this phase. Note that the
honeypot researcher should not leak any live asset yet — this sole purpose of this
phase is to test components and the entire system prior to live deployment.
Experiments. After successfully testing the system, the honeypot researcher pro-
ceeds to leak honey assets to the intended audience while monitoring all honey
assets via the monitor infrastructure. Leaks must be carried out in a convincing man-
ner. For instance, while leaking honey assets, the researcher, within ethical bounds,
may carefully mimic known modus operandi of cybercriminals that distribute stolen
goods. In this thesis, we explain how we leaked honey assets at the beginning of
each experiment. The first asset leak signifies the beginning of experiments.
System maintenance. In the course of experiments, it may be necessary to ap-
ply changes to honey assets or monitor infrastructure, or both. For instance, as
explained earlier, changes in external platforms that host honey assets may ne-
cessitate minor updates in the monitor infrastructure. Similarly, cybercriminals that
visit honey assets may change the credentials of those honey assets and it may be
necessary to revert those credentials. These steps constitute system maintenance.
Depending on the specific honeypot design and implementation, this phase may not
always be necessary.
Data analysis. During and after experiments, the researcher analyses the data
collected from honey assets and draws inferences. This concludes the honeypot
development life cycle.
3.5 Potential alternatives
In this section, we discuss potential alternative approaches to understanding mali-
cious activity in online accounts and justify our use of honeypots instead of these
alternatives.
Alternative 1. An alternative to our honeypot approach will be to collaborate with
online services (for instance, by working on site with them and deploying honeypots
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from the inside). This has the advantage of better visibility and ease of access than
our approach can offer. It will likely translate into better nuance in research findings.
However, the downside is the possible loss of research independence. Also, such
experiments will be hard to replicate since they will be based on proprietary data
and systems. Finally, non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) may place dire constraints
on the dissemination of research findings.
Alternative 2. Another alternative will be to approach law enforcement agencies
with a view to interviewing suspects (or convicts) that have been involved in cyber-
crime. This will elicit information on their methods and activity, for instance, how long
they stay in stolen accounts, the content they pay particular attention to, and how
they launch and coordinate multi-step attacks. First, gaining such sensitive access
to participants will be hard for the average researcher. Second, an obvious problem
is that such findings will be based on self-reporting which is prone to overestimation
and underestimation [78], and may not be as reliable as collecting and analysing
data in the wild. Our honey assets method, despite its limitations, addresses this
problem by relying on primary data collected from accounts in the wild.
Alternative 3. It is possible to simulate compromised online accounts in a closed
or controlled environment in which crowdsourced participants, say Mechanical Turk
workers,6 will pretend to be criminals and will exhibit “criminal behaviour” during
their interactions with the accounts. This option was considered while laying out the
author’s initial research plan, but was quickly discarded, since the quality of find-
ings will be questionable. The behaviour of participants will differ from real criminal
behaviour. Our honey assets method addresses this problem by making criminals
believe they are interacting with real accounts. They also do not know that their
interactions will be recorded. This leads to realistic interactions.
Hence, we chose the honey assets method over other approaches.7 Besides,
the honey assets method provided an avenue for us to apply systems design and
engineering expertise towards bridging an open research gap.
6https://www.mturk.com/
7In other words, we chose the honeypot boulevard over other roads.
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3.6 Limitations of the honey assets method
First, as a researcher external to the online service that hosts honey assets, it is
difficult to scale up experiments using our honey assets approach because creating
many realistic assets takes a lot of time and effort. However, we succeeded in build-
ing a large-scale honeypot that comprised social accounts in Chapter 5 because we
received some help from collaborators in the online service that hosted our honey
assets. In other words, scaling up is not an issue if the service provider is closely
involved in creating and operating honeypots.
Second, sourcing realistic data for honey assets is hard. Depending on the spe-
cific honeypot implementation, it may be sufficient to use randomly-generated data
(for instance, fake financial data in Chapter 6). In other cases, it may be necessary
to use datasets generated during real human activity, which may be hard to obtain.
After obtaining such datasets, adequate care must be taken to remove all personally
identifiable information (PII) from them, prior to use, which is a non-trivial task.
Third, specific honeypot implementations are not platform-agnostic (but our honey
assets approach is platform-agnostic). This makes it impossible to reuse already
implemented honeypot tools on different platforms. For instance, we had to build
three different honeypot implementations for this thesis, instead of building one and
reusing it across three platforms. This implies that our honey assets method con-
sumes a lot of time and effort in building the required infrastructure and honey as-
sets.
Despite these limitations, the honey assets method presented in this chapter
has successfully produced honeypots on various platforms. This shows that our
approach is a viable one for researchers seeking to understand malicious activity in
online accounts.
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Table 3.1: While exploring related studies, we encountered other system require-
ments to build honeypot systems.
This thesis Bowen et al. [22] Chin et al. [30] Mulliner et al. [70] Vrable et al. [102]
Accessible Believable Scalability Monitoring Scalability
Realistic Enticing Flexibility Audit logging Containment
Measurable Conspicuous Attack containment Containment
Ethical Detectable Stealth Visibility
Robust Variability Resource management
Non-interference Ease of deployment
Differentiable
3.7 Additional requirements
While exploring related studies, we encountered other system requirements that
have been proposed to build honeypot systems. Table 3.1 shows those require-
ments listed alongside the ones we identified in this thesis (ARMER requirements).
Mulliner et al. [70] used the term “challenges” instead of “requirements,” but close
observation revealed that those challenges were equivalent to system requirements,
hence we included them. Common requirements across most of the studies include
containment,8 measurable, and accessible. Table 3.1 reveals synonyms and ex-
act matches for these requirements across most of the listed studies. Containment
dominates the table — this shows the importance of ensuring that honey assets are
designed and implemented in a way that minimises harm to all parties involved.
8Subsumed in the ethical requirement mentioned earlier in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Hijacked Webmail Accounts
4.1 Contributions
First, we developed a system to monitor activity in Gmail accounts towards under-
standing malicious activity in compromised webmail accounts. We publicly released
the source code of our system1 to allow other researchers to deploy their own Gmail
accounts for related studies, and add to the understanding that the security commu-
nity has of malicious activity in online services. To the best of our knowledge, it is
the first publicly available Gmail honeypot infrastructure. Second, we deployed 100
honey accounts on Gmail and leaked credentials through various outlets — under-
ground forums, public paste sites, and virtual machines infected with information-
stealing malware. Third, we provide detailed measurements of the activity logged
by our honey accounts over a period of 7 months. The work in this chapter was origi-
nally presented in the 2016 ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC’16) by the
author of this thesis, and it appeared in IMC’16 conference proceedings. This work
has appeared on BBC News,2 Huffington Post,3 and The State of Security,4 among
other news outlets. It also emerged as a finalist in the Cyber Security Awareness
1https://bitbucket.org/gianluca_students/gmail-honeypot
2https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37510501
3https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/what-hackers-actually-do-with-your-
stolen-personal-information_uk_58049f32e4b0e982146cd18f
4https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/heres-what-
happens-after-your-webmail-account-is-compromised/
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Week Europe 2017 research competition. Via these, we have been able to increase
the awareness of the general public about malicious activity in online accounts.
Collaborators. We express our profound appreciation to Enrico Mariconti (UCL
PhD student) for his contributions to the design and implementation of the malware
honeypot infrastructure in Section 4.4.3 (Enrico and the author built it collabora-
tively). Enrico also helped to carry out statistical tests in Section 4.5.5. We thank
Mark Risher (Google) and Tejaswi Nadahalli (Google) for their support throughout
the project.
4.2 Overview
The wealth of information that users store in webmail accounts on services such as
Gmail, Yahoo! Mail, or Outlook, as well as the possibility of misusing them for il-
licit activities, attracts cybercriminals who actively engage in compromising such ac-
counts. They obtain credentials to victims’ accounts via phishing [37], infecting users
with information-stealing malware [90], or compromising large password databases,
leveraging the fact that people often use the same password across multiple ser-
vices [35]. Stolen credentials and data can be used privately by the cybercriminal or
sold in underground markets to other cybercriminals for profit [91].
Cybercriminals use compromised accounts in multiple ways. First, they can use
them to send spam [41]. This practice is particularly effective because the estab-
lished contacts of the account are likely to trust its owner, and are therefore more
likely to open the messages that they receive from them [58]. Similarly, the stolen
account is likely to have a history of good behaviour with the hosting service, and
malicious messages sent from it are less likely to be detected as spam, especially if
the recipients are within the same service (e.g., a Gmail account that sends spam to
other Gmail accounts) [96]. Alternatively, cybercriminals can use stolen accounts to
collect sensitive information about victims. Such information includes financial cre-
dentials, login information to other online services, and personal messages of the
victim [25].
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In general, it is difficult to study the activity of criminals in compromised online
accounts without being in control of a large online service, hence there is limited
research literature in this space (see Chapter 2 for a detailed coverage of related
literature). The rare exceptions are studies that look at information that is publicly
observable, such as messages posted on Twitter by compromised accounts [41, 42].
To close this gap, we present a system that is able to monitor the activity of attackers
in Gmail accounts.
We set up 100 Gmail accounts and populated them with data to look like web-
mail accounts that belong to employees of a fictional company. We refer to these
accounts as honey accounts. To understand how criminals use these accounts
after they are compromised, we leaked credentials to the accounts on multiple out-
lets, modelling different ways by which cybercriminals share and obtain access to
stolen credentials, namely public paste sites, underground forums, and information-
stealing malware. We then recorded activity in the honey accounts for 7 months.
Our analysis allows us to draw a taxonomy of different actions performed by vis-
itors on stolen Gmail accounts, and provides interesting insights into keywords that
visitors typically search for when looking for valuable information in these accounts.
We also show that visitors exhibit various skill levels depending on the outlet they
source stolen credentials from. Our findings complement what was reported in pre-
vious work on manual account hijacking [25], and show that the modus operandi of
miscreants varies considerably depending on how they obtain credentials to stolen
accounts. In summary, this chapter shines light on what happens within compro-
mised webmail accounts, and will be useful for other researchers and webmail ser-
vices in the quest for better detection and mitigation systems.
4.3 Background
4.3.1 Gmail accounts
In this chapter, we focus on Gmail accounts with particular attention to the actions
performed by cybercriminals when they gain access to a victim’s account. We made
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this choice over other webmail platforms because Gmail allows users to set up
scripts to augment the functionality of their accounts. It is therefore an ideal platform
for developing webmail-based honeypots. To ease the understanding of the rest of
this chapter, we briefly summarise the capabilities offered by webmail accounts in
general, and by Gmail in particular.
After authenticating to a Gmail account, a user is presented with a view of their
inbox. This contains all emails that the user has received and highlights the ones
that have not been read yet by displaying them in boldface font. Users have the
option to mark emails that are important and need particular attention by starring
them. Users are also given search functionality which allows them to find emails
of interest by entering related keywords. They can also organise emails by placing
related messages in folders or assigning descriptive labels to them. Such operations
can be automated by creating rules to automatically process received emails. When
writing emails, content is saved in a drafts folder until the user decides to send it.
Sent emails can be found in a dedicated folder and they can be also be searched by
the user.
4.3.2 Google Apps Script
Google Apps Script is a cloud-based scripting engine that can be used to augment
Google Apps and extend their functionality.5 It is JavaScript-based but runs on
Google Cloud, not client endpoints. It is possible to write scripts, otherwise known
as lightweight apps, to perform specified tasks when a condition is met or an event
happens. For instance, a time-driven trigger can be fired at a particular time of
day or an event-driven trigger fired by a file open event. When a trigger is fired,
the JavaScript function associated to that trigger will be executed, for instance, to
send an email to a specified address or carry out some computations. A detailed
treatment of triggers can be found in Google Apps Script documentation.6 Our web-
mail honeypot infrastructure relies on time-driven and event-driven triggers within a
5https://developers.google.com/apps-script/overview
6https://developers.google.com/apps-script/guides/triggers/
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hidden custom app to track and report accesses and changes in webmail accounts
to us. It is important to note the resource quotas and execution limits imposed by
Google on scripts.7 These quotas and limits must be considered and factored into
design decisions on projects that incorporate Apps Script, because exceeding them
will cause scripts to fail.
4.4 Method and experimental setup
In this section, we describe the process of creating and deploying honey accounts.
We also present a detailed explanation of how our webmail honeypot system works.
4.4.1 Honey accounts
Our honey accounts are webmail accounts instrumented with Google Apps Script to
monitor activity in them in a stealthy manner. The script, hidden in otherwise empty
Google spreadsheets, sends notifications to a webmail account under our control
(we refer to it as a safehouse webmail account), whenever an email is opened, sent,
or “starred.” In addition, each script sends copies of all draft emails in honey ac-
counts to the safehouse webmail account. We added a heartbeat message function
to each honey account to send a status notification once a day to the safehouse
webmail account, to attest that the account was still functional and had not been
blocked by Google. As we mentioned earlier, within each honey account, each script
instance was hidden in an otherwise empty and inconspicuous Google spreadsheet,
and authorised by the author prior to deployment.8 This made it unlikely for attackers
to find and delete them.
4.4.2 Data collection
In this section, we describe the main components of the webmail honeypot infras-
tructure that monitors honey accounts, as shown in Figure 4.1.
7https://developers.google.com/apps-script/guides/services/quotas
8We started all script instances prior to deployment and they continued running during experiments.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the webmail honeypot infrastructure. Honey accounts send
activity records to us via the safehouse webmail account, mail server, and activity
downloader, for offline parsing.
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Safehouse webmail account. This is a regular webmail account that acts as a
safe haven for communications originating from the honey accounts. The script
that we hid in honey accounts sends notifications and heartbeat messages to the
safehouse webmail account, as described earlier. We periodically retrieve those
email notifications via an email client that runs the Post Office Protocol (POP) and
parse them offline.
Mail server. One of the main components of our infrastructure comprises a mod-
ified mail server. Unlike a regular mail server that forwards email messages, we
configured the mail server to receive emails and write them to disk only. It does
not forward them to the intended destination. In other words, it works as a sinkhole
mail server. To minimise abuse, we configured each honey account’s default send-
from address to an email address under our control (it points to our sinkhole mail
server). Hence, all emails sent from the honey accounts were delivered to the mail
server only, not to the intended destination, and we avoided the problem of spam
from honey accounts.
Activity downloader. Google Apps Script is powerful but does not provide all the
information required in this chapter. For example, it does not provide location infor-
mation and IP addresses of visitors to honey accounts. To track those accesses,
we set up an activity downloader, an external script that drives a web browser, pe-
riodically connects to each honey account, and records information about visitors
(cookie identifier, geolocation information, and times of accesses, among others).
It navigates to the visitor activity page of each honey account and downloads that
information to disk, for offline parsing. By collecting information from visitor activity
pages, we obtain location and system configuration information regarding accesses,
as provided by Google’s geolocation and system configuration fingerprinting system.
Health inspector. To check that honey accounts were up and running, we period-
ically ran the health inspector on offline activity reports to check for recency (with
emphasis on heartbeat messages9 that were sent by honey accounts daily). Out-
9Trivia — Heartbeat messages that arrive at the safehouse webmail account from our honey ac-
counts contain the string “ALIVE” to indicate good health.
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of-date heartbeat messages indicate dead accounts (that is, blocked by Google) or
hijacked accounts (someone changed their passwords).
We believe that our honey account and monitoring framework unleashes multiple
possibilities for researchers who want to carry out further studies on the behaviour
of attackers in webmail accounts. For this reason, we released the source code of
our system publicly.10 In addition to the work in this chapter, our webmail honeypot
infrastructure was also employed in [16] to study the effects of language differentia-
tion on the activity of cybercriminals in webmail accounts (not included in this thesis).
This demonstrates the versatility of our system.
4.4.3 Experiment setup
In line with the honey assets method proposed in Chapter 3, we first set up honey
accounts on Gmail and then leaked them through multiple outlets often used by
cybercriminals.
Creating honey accounts. We created 100 Gmail accounts and assigned random
combinations of popular first and last names to them, similar to the approach in [93].
It is important to note that creating these accounts is a manual process. Google
rate-limits the creation of new accounts from the same IP address by presenting
a phone verification page after a few accounts have been created. These factors
imposed limits on the number of honey accounts we succeeded in creating. We
then populated the freshly-created accounts with emails from the public Enron email
dataset [61]. This dataset contains emails sent by executives of Enron, an energy
corporation, and was publicly released as evidence during Enron’s bankruptcy trial.
This dataset is suitable for our purposes since the emails in it are typical emails
exchanged by corporate users. To make the honey accounts believable and avoid
raising suspicion from cybercriminals that connect to them, we mapped distinct re-
cipients in the Enron dataset to our fictional honey profiles (that is, the fictional “own-
ers” of the honey accounts), and replaced first names and last names in the dataset
with honey first names and last names. In addition, we changed all instances of
10https://bitbucket.org/gianluca_students/gmail-honeypot
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“Enron” to a fictional company name that we came up with. In order to have re-
alistic email timestamps, we translated the old Enron email timestamps to recent
timestamps slightly earlier than our experiment start date. For instance, given two
email timestamps t1 and t2 in the Enron dataset such that t1 is earlier than t2, we
translated them to more recent timestamps T1 and T2 such that T1 corresponds to
an earlier time than T2. We then scheduled those emails to be sent to the recipient
honey accounts at times T1 and T2 respectively. We sent 200 – 300 emails from the
transformed Enron dataset to each honey account while populating them.
Leaking account credentials. To achieve our objectives, we had to entice cy-
bercriminals to interact with the honey accounts. To this end, we selected paste
sites and underground forums as appropriate venues for leaking account creden-
tials, since they tend to be misused by cybercriminals for dissemination of stolen
credentials. In addition, we leaked some credentials through malware since this is
a popular way by which professional cybercriminals steal credentials and compro-
mise accounts [19]. We divided the honey accounts into groups and leaked their
credentials in different locations as shown in Table 4.1. We leaked 50 accounts, in
total, via the paste sites listed in Table 4.2. For 20 of them, we leaked basic cre-
dentials (username and password pairs) on the popular paste sites pastebin.com
and pastie.org. We leaked 10 account credentials on Russian paste websites
(p.for-us.nl and paste.org.ru). For the remaining 20 accounts, we leaked user-
name and password pairs along with UK and US location information of the fictional
owners that we associated with the honey accounts. We also included date of birth
information for each fake person. We leaked 30 account credentials on underground
forums (listed as outlets 5 – 8 in Table 4.2). For 10 of them, we specified only user-
name and password pairs, without additional information. In a manner similar to
the paste site leaks described earlier, we appended UK and US location information
to underground forum leaks, and claimed that the fictional account owners lived in
those locations. We also included date of birth information for each fake person.
For forum leaks, we used the forums listed in Table 4.2. We selected them be-
cause they were open for anybody to register and were highly ranked in Google
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Table 4.1: Honey account groupings showing the number of account credentials we
leaked via each outlet type.
Group Accounts Leak outlet
1 30 paste websites (no location)
2 20 paste websites (with location)
3 10 forums (no location)
4 20 forums (with location)
5 20 malware (no location)
search results. We acknowledge that some underground forums are not open and
have a strict vetting policy to let users in [91]. Unfortunately, however, we did not
have access to any private forum. The same approach of studying open under-
ground forums has been used in previous work [3]. While leaking credentials on
underground forums, we mimicked the modus operandi of cybercriminals that was
outlined by Stone-Gross et al. [91]. They showed that cybercriminals often post a
sample of their stolen datasets on forums to show that the accounts are real, and
promise to provide additional data in exchange for a fee. We recorded the messages
that we received on underground forums, mostly enquiries about obtaining the full
dataset, but we did not respond to them.
Finally, to study the activity of criminals that obtain credentials through information-
stealing malware, we leaked credentials of 20 accounts to information-stealing mal-
ware. To this end, we selected malware samples from Zeus family, one of the most
popular information-stealing malware families [19], as well as samples from Corebot
family. We provide detailed information about our malware honeypot infrastructure
(sandbox) in the next section.
The reason for leaking different accounts on different outlets is to study dif-
ferences in the behaviour of cybercriminals that gain access to stolen credentials
through different sources. Similarly, we provide decoy location information in some
leaks and not in others, to observe differences in malicious activity depending on
the amount and type of information available to cybercriminals. As we show in Sec-
tion 4.5, accesses to honey accounts were heavily influenced by the presence of
additional location information in leaked credentials.
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Table 4.2: To lure visitors to the honey accounts, we leaked account credentials
through paste sites, underground forums, and information-stealing malware. We
chose these paste sites because they allow public pastes, and the forums because
joining them does not require introductions or vetting.
Outlet Type URL or name
1 Paste site pastebin.com
2 Paste site pastie.org
3 Paste site p.for-us.nl
4 Paste site paste.org.ru
5 Forum offensivecommunity.net
6 Forum bestblackhatforums.eu
7 Forum hackforums.net
8 Forum blackhatworld.com
9 Malware Zeus infostealer
10 Malware Corebot infostealer
Malware honeypot infrastructure. Our malware sandbox system works as follows.
A local web server entity manages honey credentials (usernames and passwords)
and infomation-stealing malware samples. The host machine creates a Virtual Ma-
chine (VM) which contacts the web server to request an executable malware file
and a honey credential file. The structure is similar to the one explained in [59]. The
malware file is then executed in the VM (that is, the VM infects itself with malware),
after which a script drives a browser in the VM to login to Gmail using the previously
downloaded credentials. This exposes the honey credentials to malware that is al-
ready running in the VM, and leads to credential theft. After some time, the infected
VM is deleted and a fresh one is created. This new VM downloads another malware
sample and a different honey credential file, and repeats the infection and login op-
eration. To maximise the efficiency of our configuration prior to the experiment, we
carried out a test without the Gmail login process, to select only samples whose
C&C servers were still up and running.
4.4.4 Threats to validity
We acknowledge that seeding honey accounts with emails from the Enron dataset
may introduce bias into our results, and may make the honey accounts less believ-
able to visitors. However, it is necessary to note that the Enron dataset is the only
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large publicly available email corpus, to the best of our knowledge. To make the
emails believable, we changed names, dates, and company name in the emails,
using automatic search-and-replace string processing techniques. In the future, we
will work towards obtaining or generating a better email dataset. Also, some visitors
may notice that the honey accounts did not receive any new emails during the pe-
riod of observation, and this may affect the way visitors interact with the accounts.
Another threat is that we only leaked honey credentials through the outlets listed
previously (namely paste sites, underground forums, and malware), therefore our
results reflect the activity of participants present on those outlets only. Finally, since
we selected underground forums that are publicly accessible, our observations may
not reflect the modus operandi of actors who are active on closed forums that re-
quire vetting to join. Despite these factors, our approach provides valuable insights
into what happens in compromised webmail accounts and provides a robust way for
other researchers seeking to carry out related experiments.
4.4.5 Ethics
The experiments in this chapter require some ethical considerations. First of all, by
granting cybercriminals access to our honey accounts, we incur the risk that those
accounts will be used to harm third parties. To minimise this risk, we configured the
accounts in a way that all emails would be forwarded to a sinkhole mail server under
our control, and never delivered to the outside world. We also established a close
collaboration with Google and made sure to report any malicious activity that needed
attention to them. Although the suspicious login filters that Google typically uses
to protect their accounts from unauthorised accesses were disabled for our honey
accounts, all other malicious activity detection algorithms were still in place, and in
fact, Google suspended a number of accounts that engaged in suspicious activity. It
is important to note, however, that our approach does not rely on help from Google
to work. Our main reason for seeking Google’s help to disable suspicious login filters
was to ensure that all accesses got through to the honey accounts (most accesses
would be blocked if Google did not disable the login filters). This does not directly
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affect our methodology, and as a result does not reduce the wider applicability of our
approach. It is also important to note that Google did not share with us any details
on the techniques used internally for the detection of malicious activity on Gmail.
Another point of risk was ensuring that the malware in our VMs did not harm third
parties. To mitigate this risk, we followed common practices [82] such as restricting
the bandwidth available to our virtual machines and sinkholing all email traffic sent
by them. Finally, our experiments involved deceiving cybercriminals by providing
them fake accounts that contained fake personal information. To ensure that our
experiments were run in an ethical fashion, we obtained ethics approval from UCL
beforehand.
4.5 Data Analysis
We monitored activity in the honey accounts for 7 months, from 25th June, 2015 to
16th February, 2016. In this section, we first provide an overview of our findings
and then discuss a taxonomy of the types of activity that we observed. We focus on
the differences in modus operandi shown by cybercriminals who obtain credentials
to accounts from various outlets. We then investigate if cybercriminals attempt to
evade location-based detection systems by connecting from locations that are closer
to the places that account owners typically connect from. We also develop a metric
to infer keywords that attackers search for when looking for interesting information
in an email account. Finally, we analyse how certain types of cybercriminals appear
to be stealthier and more advanced than others.
Cookies and accesses. Google records each unique access to a Gmail account
and labels that access with a unique cookie identifier. These unique cookie identi-
fiers, along with more information including times of accesses, are included in visitor
activity pages of Gmail accounts. Our scripts (previously described in Section 4.4)
extract this data. For the sake of convenience, we will use the terms “cookie” and
“unique access” interchangeably in the remainder of this chapter.
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4.5.1 Activity overview
We created, instrumented, and leaked 100 Gmail accounts for our experiments. To
avoid biasing the results, we removed all accesses made to honey accounts by IP
addresses from our honeypot infrastructure. We also removed all accesses that
originated from London (UK) where our monitoring infrastructure was located. After
this filtering operation, we observed 326 unique accesses to the accounts, during
which 147 emails were opened, 845 emails were sent, and 12 unique draft emails
were composed by visitors. In total, 90 accounts received accesses, comprising 41
accounts leaked to paste sites, 30 accounts leaked to underground forums, and 19
accounts leaked through malware. 42 accounts were blocked by Google during ex-
periments because of suspicious activity. We were able to record activity in those
accounts for some time before Google blocked them. 36 accounts were hijacked
by visitors, that is, the passwords of such accounts were changed by visitors. As a
result, we lost control of those accounts. We did not observe any attempt by attack-
ers to change the default send-from addresses of our honey accounts. However,
assuming that happened and attackers started sending spam messages, Google
would block such accounts since we asked them to monitor the accounts with partic-
ular attention. A dataset containing parsed metadata of accesses to honey accounts
is publicly available.11
4.5.2 Taxonomy of account accesses
From the activity observed in honey accounts, we devised a taxonomy of attack-
ers/visitors based on unique accesses to the accounts. We identified four types of
visitors (described next).
Curious. These accesses constitute the most basic type of access to stolen ac-
counts. After getting hold of account credentials, people connect to those accounts
to check if the credentials truly work. Afterwards, they do not carry out any additional
action. The majority of observed accesses belong to this category, accounting for
11http://dx.doi.org/10.14324/000.ds.1508297
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224 accesses. We acknowledge that this large number of curious accesses may
be due in part to experienced attackers avoiding interactions with the accounts after
logging in, probably after careful observations indicating that the accounts do not
look entirely real. This could potentially introduce some bias into our results.
Gold diggers. When connecting to a stolen account, attackers often want to un-
derstand its worth [25]. For this reason, after logging into honey accounts, some
attackers search for sensitive information such as other login credentials and finan-
cial attachments. They also seek information that may be useful in spearphishing
attacks. We call these accesses “gold diggers.” Previous research has shown that
this practice is quite common for manual account hijackers [25]. In this paper, we
confirm that finding, provide a methodology to assess the keywords that visitors
search for, and analyse differences in modus operandi of gold digger accesses for
credentials leaked through various outlets. In total, we observed 82 accesses of this
type.
Spammers. One of the main capabilities of webmail accounts is email sending.
Previous research has shown that large spamming botnets have code in their bots
and C&C infrastructure to take advantage of this capability, by having the bots con-
nect directly to compromised accounts and send spam [91]. Accesses belong to
this category if they send any email. We observed 8 accounts that recorded such
accesses. This low number of accounts shows that sending spam is not one of
the main purposes that cybercriminals use compromised accounts for, when stolen
through the outlets that we studied.
Hijackers. A stealthy criminal is likely to keep a low profile when accessing a stolen
account to avoid raising suspicion. Less stealthy miscreants, however, might lock
the legitimate owner out of their account by changing their password. We call these
accesses “hijackers.” In total, we observed 36 accesses of this type. A password
change prevents us from reaching the account’s visitor activity page, therefore we
are unable to collect information about accesses to the account afterwards.
It is important to note that the taxonomy classes that we described are not exclu-
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of types of accesses for various leak outlets. Most accesses
belong to the “curious” category. It is possible to spot differences in types of activities
for different leak outlets. For example, accounts leaked via malware do not present
activity of the “hijacker” type. On the other hand, hijackers are particularly common
among miscreants who obtain stolen credentials through paste sites.
sive. For example, an attacker might use an account to send spam emails (“spam-
mer” category) and then change the password of that account (“hijacker” category).
Such overlaps occurred often in the accesses recorded in our honey accounts. It is
interesting to note that there was no access that behaved exclusively as “spammer.”
Miscreants that sent spam through our honey accounts also acted as “hijackers” or
“gold diggers.”
We set out to understand the distribution of different types of accesses in ac-
counts that were leaked through various outlets. Figure 4.2 shows a breakdown of
this distribution. Visitors who gain access to stolen accounts through malware are
the stealthiest and never lock the legitimate owners out of their accounts. Instead,
they limit their activity to checking if the credentials are real or searching for sensi-
tive information in the accounts, possibly in an attempt to estimate the value of the
accounts. Accounts leaked through paste sites and underground forums revealed
the presence of hijackers. 20% of the accesses to accounts leaked through paste
sites, in particular, belong to this category. Accounts leaked through underground
forums, on the other hand, recorded the highest percentage of gold digger accesses
(about 30% of all accesses).
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4.5.3 Timing of activity
Here we provide a detailed analysis of unique accesses that were recorded in the
honey accounts, with emphasis on their timing.
Duration of accesses. For each cookie identifier, we recorded the time that the
cookie first appeared in a particular honey account as t0 and the last time it ap-
peared as tlast. From this information, we computed the duration of activity of each
cookie as tlast   t0. Note that tlast of each cookie is a lower bound since we cease
to obtain information about cookies if the password of the honey account that is
recording cookies is changed, for instance. Figure 4.3 shows Cumulative Distri-
bution Functions (CDFs) of the duration of unique accesses of different types of
visitors. The vast majority of accesses are very short, lasting only a few minutes
and never coming back. Spammer accesses, in particular, tend to send emails in
bursts for a certain period and then disconnect. Hijacker and gold digger accesses,
on the other hand, have a long tail of about 10% accesses that keep coming back
for several days in a row. The CDFs show that most curious accesses are repeated
over many days, indicating that the visitors keep coming back to find out if there is
new information in the accounts. This stands in conflict with the finding in [25] which
states that most cybercriminals connect to a compromised webmail account once, to
assess its value within a few minutes. However, [25] focused on accounts compro-
mised via phishing pages, while we look at a broader range of ways through which
criminals can obtain stolen credentials. Our results show that the modes of opera-
tion of cybercriminals vary depending on the outlets they obtain stolen credentials
from.
Time between leak and first access. Next, we studied how long it takes from the
time that credentials are leaked via different outlets until our infrastructure records
accesses from visitors. Figure 4.4 shows CDFs of the time between leak and first
access for accounts leaked through different outlets. Within the first 25 days after
leak, we recorded 80% of all unique accesses to accounts leaked to paste sites,
60% of all unique accesses to accounts leaked to underground forums, and 40% of
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Figure 4.3: CDFs of duration of unique accesses per activity type in our honey
accounts. The vast majority of unique accesses last a few minutes. Spammers tend
to use accounts aggressively for a short time and then disconnect. The other types
of accesses, and in particular curious ones, come back after some time, possibly to
check for new activity in the honey accounts.
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all unique accesses to accounts leaked via malware. A particularly interesting ob-
servation is the nature of unique accesses to accounts leaked via malware. A close
look at Figure 4.4 reveals rapid increases in unique accesses to honey accounts
leaked to malware, about 30 days after the leak, and also after 100 days (indicated
by two sharp inflection points).
Figure 4.5 sheds more light into what happened at those inflection points. It
reports the unique accesses to each honey account over time. Note that accounts
that were leaked on public outlets such as forums and paste sites can be accessed
by multiple visitors at the same time. Account credentials leaked through malware,
on the other hand, are available only to the botmaster that stole them, until they
decide to sell them or give them to someone else. Seeing bursts, in accesses to
accounts leaked through malware, months after the actual leak happened indicates
that the accounts were visited again by the same criminal who operated the malware
infrastructure, or that the accounts were sold on an underground market and that
another miscreant is now using them. This hypothesis is somewhat confirmed by
the fact that these bursts in accesses were the gold digger type (we checked), while
all previous accesses to the same accounts were of the curious type. In addition,
Figure 4.5 shows that the majority of accounts leaked to paste sites were accessed
within a few days of leak, while a particular subset was not accessed for more than
two months. That subset refers to the ten credentials we leaked to Russian paste
sites. Those honey accounts were not accessed for more than two months from
the time of leak. This either indicates that cybercriminals are not many on Russian
paste sites or they did not believe that the accounts were real.
4.5.4 System configuration of accesses
We observed a wide variety of devices and browsers in accesses to leaked ac-
counts by leveraging Google’s system fingerprinting information (available to us in-
side honey accounts).
Browsers. As shown in Figure 4.6, accesses to accounts leaked on paste sites
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Figure 4.4: CDFs of the time between first credential leak and first visit. Accounts
leaked through paste sites received accesses earlier than accounts leaked through
other outlets.
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Figure 4.5: Duration between time of leak and unique accesses in accounts leaked
through various outlets. Accounts leaked via malware experienced a sudden in-
crease in unique accesses after 30 days and 100 days from the leak, indicating
that they had been sold or transferred to another party by cybercriminals behind the
malware C&C infrastructure.
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were made through a variety of popular browsers, with Firefox and Chrome taking
the lead. We also recorded many accesses from unknown browsers. It is possible
for an attacker to hide browser information from Google servers by presenting an
empty user agent and hiding other fingerprintable information [75]. About 50% of
accesses to accounts leaked through paste sites were not identifiable. Chrome and
Firefox take the lead in groups leaked in underground forums as well, but there is
less variety of browsers there. Interestingly, all accesses to accounts in malware
groups were made from unknown browsers. This shows that cybercriminals that
accessed accounts leaked through malware were stealthier than others.
Operating systems. While analysing the operating systems on devices used by
visitors, we observed that honey accounts leaked through malware mostly received
accesses fromWindows computers, followed by Mac OS X and Linux. This is shown
in Figure 4.7. In the paste sites and underground forum groups, we observed a wider
range of operating systems. More than 50% of computers in the three categories
ran on Windows. It is interesting to note that Android devices were also used to
connect to honey accounts in paste site and underground forum groups.
The diversity of devices and browsers in paste site and underground forum
groups indicates a motley mix of cybercriminals with various motives and capa-
bilities, compared to the malware groups that are more homogeneous. It is also
obvious that attackers that steal credentials through malware make more effort to
cover their tracks by evading browser fingerprinting.
4.5.5 On the origins of accesses
We recorded origin locations in accesses that were logged by our infrastructure.
Our goal was to understand patterns in the locations of criminals. Out of the 326
recorded accesses, 132 came from TOR exit nodes. More specifically, 28 accesses
to accounts leaked on paste sites were made via TOR, out of a total of 144 accesses
to accounts leaked on paste sites. 48 accesses to accounts leaked on forums were
made through TOR, out of a total of 125 accesses made to accounts leaked on
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Figure 4.6: Browsers used during accesses to honey accounts.
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Figure 4.7: Operating systems used during accesses to honey accounts.
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forums. We observed 57 accesses to accounts leaked through malware and all ex-
cept one of those accesses were made via TOR. We removed these accesses from
the location analysis in this section — they do not provide information on the physi-
cal location of the visitors.12 After removing TOR exit nodes, 173 unique accesses
presented location information. To determine this location information, we used the
geolocation information provided by Google via visitor activity pages of honey ac-
counts. We observed accesses from a total of 29 countries. To understand whether
the IP addresses that connected to our honey accounts had been recorded in previ-
ous malicious activity, we ran checks against Spamhaus blacklist.13 We found 20 IP
addresses that accessed our honey accounts in the Spamhaus blacklist. Because of
the nature of this blacklist, we believe that the addresses belong to malware-infected
machines that were used by cybercriminals to connect to the stolen accounts.
One of our goals was to observe if cybercriminals would attempt to evade location-
based login risk analysis systems by tweaking access origins. In particular, we
wanted to assess if telling criminals the location of an account owner will influence
the location that they will then connect from. Despite observing 57 accesses to
honey accounts leaked through malware, we discovered that all these connections,
except one, originated from TOR exit nodes. This shows that malware operators that
accessed our accounts preferred to hide their location through the use of anonymis-
ing systems rather than modifying their access location based on knowledge of the
usual login location of the account owner (or both).
While leaking honey credentials, we chose London and Pontiac as our decoy UK
and US locations respectively. In other words, during leaks, we claimed that some
honey accounts belonged to fictional persons living in either London or Pontiac.
However, we realised that leaking multiple accounts with the same location might
raise suspicion. Hence, we chose various UK and US locations such that London
and Pontiac were the midpoints of those locations.
To observe the impact of knowledge of login location on the locations that cy-
12Strangely, TOR entries in visitor activity pages of honey accounts provided neither location infor-
mation nor IP addresses.
13https://www.spamhaus.org/
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bercriminals connect from, we calculated the median values of distances of the
locations recorded in unique accesses from the midpoints of the advertised de-
coy locations in our account leaks. For accesses A to honey accounts leaked on
paste sites, advertised with UK information, we extracted location information, trans-
lated them to geographical coordinates LA, and computed the dist paste UK vector
as distance(LA,midUK), where midUK are London’s coordinates. Distances were
measured in kilometres. We extracted the median values of all distance vectors and
plotted concentric circles on UK and USmaps, by specifying those median distances
as radii of the circles, as shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.
Interestingly, we observe that connections to accounts with advertised locations
originate from places closer to our midpoints than accounts with leaked information
containing usernames and passwords only. Figure 4.8 shows that connections to
accounts leaked on paste sites and forums result in smaller median circles, that is,
the connections originate from locations closer to London, the UK midpoint. The
smallest circle is for the accounts leaked on paste sites, with advertised UK location
information (radius 1400 kilometres). In contrast, the circle of accounts leaked on
paste sites without location information has a radius of 1784 kilometres. The me-
dian circle of accounts leaked in underground forums, with no advertised location
information, is the largest circle in Figure 4.8, while the one of accounts leaked in
underground forums, along with UK location information, is smaller.
We obtained similar results in the US plot, with some interesting distinctions.
As shown in Figure 4.9, connections to honey accounts leaked on paste sites, with
advertised US locations, are clustered around the US midpoint, as indicated by the
circle with a radius of 939 kilometres, compared to the median circle of accounts
leaked on paste sites without location information, which has a radius of 7900 kilo-
metres. However, despite the fact that the median circle of accounts leaked in un-
derground forums with advertised locations is smaller than that of the one without
advertised location information, the difference in their radii is not as pronounced.
This again supports the indication that cybercriminals on paste sites exhibit more
location malleability, that is, they cloak their origins of accesses to appear closer
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Figure 4.8: Distance of login locations from London, UK (advertised during creden-
tial leaks). Red lines indicate credentials leaked on paste sites with no location
information, green lines indicate credentials leaked on paste sites with location in-
formation, purple lines indicate credentials leaked on underground forums without
location information, while blue lines indicate credentials leaked on underground
forums with location information.
74
Median-dist-pastebin-noloc-CENT-US
Median-dist-forum-noloc-CENT-US
Median-dist-pastebin-US
Median-dist-forum-US
Figure 4.9: Distance of login locations from Pontiac, MI (advertised during credential
leaks). Red lines indicate credentials leaked on paste sites with no location informa-
tion, green lines indicate credentials leaked on paste sites with location information,
purple lines indicate credentials leaked on underground forums without location in-
formation, while blue lines indicate credentials leaked on underground forums with
location information.
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to the account owner’s location if they know it. It also shows that cybercriminals
on underground forums are less sophisticated or care less than the ones on paste
sites.
Statistical tests. As explained previously, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show that accesses
to leaked accounts happen closer to owners’ locations if such location information
is included in the leak. To confirm the statistical significance of this finding, we per-
formed a Cramer Von Mises test [33]. The Anderson version [8] of this test can be
used to understand if two vectors likely belong to the same statistical distribution or
not. The p-value has to be under 0.01 for us state that it is possible to reject the
null hypothesis,14 otherwise it is not possible to state with statistical significance that
both distance vectors belong to different distributions. The result of the test on paste
sites vectors (p-values of 0.0017415 for UK location information versus no known
location and 0.0000007 for US location information versus no known location) al-
lows us to reject the null hypothesis, thus we state conclusively that the two vectors
belong to different distributions, while we cannot say the same for tests on forum
vectors (p-values of 0.272883 in the UK case and 0.272011 in the US one). There-
fore, we conclusively state that criminals that use paste sites connect from closer
locations when location information is provided along with leaked credentials. We
cannot reach that conclusion in the case of accounts leaked to underground forums
although Figures 4.8 and 4.9 indicate some location effects as well.
4.5.6 The gold digger’s quest
Cybercriminals compromise online accounts because of the inherent value of target
accounts. Hence, they assess accounts to decide their value and what to do with
them. We decided to study the words that they likely searched for within the honey
accounts, in order to understand and potentially characterise anomalous searches in
the accounts. A limiting factor was that we did not have access to search logs of the
honey accounts, but only to the content of the emails that were opened by visitors.
To overcome this limitation, we employed Term Frequency–Inverse Document Fre-
14Null hypothesis — Both vectors of distances belong to the same distribution.
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quency (TF-IDF). TF-IDF can be used to rank words in a corpus by importance. We
relied on TF-IDF to infer the words that visitors searched for in the honey accounts.
TF-IDF is a product of two metrics, namely Term Frequency (TF) and Inverse Doc-
ument Frequency (IDF). It allows us to infer the words that visitors searched for, by
comparing important words in the emails opened by visitors to important words in
all emails within the honey accounts.
In its simplest form, TF is a measure of how frequently term t occurs in document
d, as shown in Equation 4.1. IDF is a logarithmic scaling metric of the fraction
of documents containing term t, as shown in Equation 4.2, where D is the set of
all documents in the corpus, N is the total number of documents in the corpus,
|d 2 D : t 2 d| is the number of documents in D that contain term t. Once TF and
IDF are known, TF-IDF can be computed by multiplying TF and IDF, as shown in
Equation 4.3.
tf(t, d) = ft,d (4.1)
idf(t,D) = log
N
|d 2 D : t 2 d| (4.2)
tfidf(t, d,D) = tf(t, d)⇥ idf(t,D) (4.3)
The output of TF-IDF is a weighted metric that ranges between 0 and 1. The
closer the weighted value is to 1, the more important the term is. We evaluated TF-
IDF on a text corpus comprising two documents, that is, all emails dA in the honey
accounts and all emails dR opened by visitors. The intuition is that words that have
high importance in the emails that have been opened by a visitor, but have lower
importance in the overall dataset, are likely to be keywords that visitors searched
for in the Gmail account. We preprocessed the corpus by filtering out all words that
have less than 5 characters and removing all known header-related words, for in-
stance “delivered” and “charset,” honey email handles, and also removing signalling
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Searched words TFIDFR TFIDFA TFIDFR   TFIDFA
results 0.2250 0.0127 0.2122
bitcoin 0.1904 0.0 0.1904
family 0.1624 0.0200 0.1423
seller 0.1333 0.0037 0.1296
localbitcoins 0.1009 0.0 0.1009
account 0.1114 0.0247 0.0866
payment 0.0982 0.0157 0.0824
bitcoins 0.0768 0.0 0.0768
below 0.1236 0.0496 0.0740
listed 0.0858 0.0207 0.0651
Common words TFIDFR TFIDFA TFIDFR   TFIDFA
transfer 0.2795 0.2949 -0.0154
please 0.2116 0.2608 -0.0493
original 0.1387 0.1540 -0.0154
company 0.0420 0.1531 -0.1111
would 0.0864 0.1493 -0.0630
energy 0.0618 0.1471 -0.0853
information 0.0985 0.1308 -0.0323
about 0.1342 0.1226 0.0116
email 0.1402 0.1196 0.0207
power 0.0462 0.1175 -0.0713
Table 4.3: Top 10 words sorted by TFIDFR   TFIDFA (upper part) and top 10
words sorted by TFIDFA (lower part). The words in the upper part are the ones that
have the highest difference in importance between the emails opened by visitors and
emails in the entire corpus. Hence, they are the words that visitors likely searched
for while looking for sensitive information in the stolen accounts. The words in the
lower part, on the other hand, are the ones that have the highest importance in the
entire corpus.
information that our monitoring infrastructure introduced into the emails. After run-
ning TF-IDF on the remaining terms in the corpus, we obtained their TF-IDF values
as vectors TFIDFA and TFIDFR, the TF-IDF values of all terms in the corpus
[dA, dR]. We proceeded to compute their difference as TFIDFR   TFIDFA. The
top 10 words by TFIDFR   TFIDFA compared to the top 10 words by TFIDFA
are presented in Table 4.3. Words that have TFIDFR values that are higher than
TFIDFA values will rank higher in the list, and those are the words that visitors
likely searched for.
As seen in Table 4.3, the top 10 important words by TFIDFR TFIDFA are sen-
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sitive words, such as “Bitcoin,” “family,” and “payment.” Comparing these words with
the most important words in the entire corpus reveals that visitors likely searched for
sensitive information, especially financial information. In addition, words with high
importance in the entire corpus (for example, “company” and “energy”), shown in the
lower part of Table 4.3, have much lower importance in the emails opened by visi-
tors, and most of them have negative TFIDFR   TFIDFA values. This is a strong
indication that the emails opened in honey accounts were not opened at random,
but were the result of searches for sensitive information.
Originally, the Enron dataset had no “Bitcoin” term. That term was introduced
into the opened emails document dR through the actions of one of the criminals that
accessed some honey accounts. The criminal attempted to send blackmail mes-
sages from some honey accounts to victims of the Ashley Madison dating website
scandal,15 requesting ransoms in Bitcoin in exchange for silence. In the process,
many draft emails containing Bitcoin information were created and abandoned by
the criminal, and other visitors opened them during later accesses. Hence, our hon-
eypot infrastructure picked up Bitcoin-related terms and they rank high in Table 4.3
(the upper part), showing that visitors indicated a lot of interest in those emails.
4.5.7 Sophistication of attackers
From the accesses recorded in honey accounts, we identified three peculiar be-
haviours of cybercriminals that indicate their level of sophistication: configuration
hiding — for instance by hiding user agent information, location filter evasion —
by connecting from locations close to the account owner’s location if known, and
stealth — avoiding clearly malicious actions such as hijacking and spamming. At-
tackers accessing honey accounts leaked via different outlets exhibit different types
of sophistication. Those accessing accounts leaked through malware are stealthier
than others — they do not hijack the accounts and they do not send spam from them.
They also access the accounts via TOR network and hide their system configura-
tion, for instance, their web browsers are not fingerprintable by Google. Attackers
15https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/
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accessing accounts leaked on paste sites tend to connect from locations closer to
the account owners’ locations if known. They do so to evade detection. Attackers ac-
cessing accounts leaked in underground forums do not make significant attempts to
stay stealthy or to connect from closer locations. These differences in sophistication
can be used to characterise attacker behaviour in future work.
4.6 Interesting case studies
In this section, we present some interesting case studies that we encountered dur-
ing experiments. They help to shed more light on the actions of cybercriminals on
compromised webmail accounts.
First, attempts were made to send multiple blackmail messages to victims of the
Ashley Madison dating website scandal16 from three honey accounts. In the emails,
which were not delivered17 to the intended recipients, the blackmailer threatened
to expose victims unless they made some payments in Bitcoin to a specified Bit-
coin wallet. Tutorials on how to make Bitcoin payments were also included in the
messages. The blackmailer created and abandoned many drafts emails targeted at
more Ashley Madison scandal victims. Second, two honey accounts received notifi-
cation emails about the hidden Google Apps Script “using too much computer time.”
The notifications were opened by a visitor and we received notifications about the
opening of those “computer time” notifications. Finally, an attacker registered on a
carding forum using one of the honey accounts as registration email address. As
a result, registration confirmation information was sent to the honey account. This
shows that some of the accounts were used as stepping stones by cybercriminals
to perform further illicit activity.
16https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashley-madison-data/
17Recall that we set up a mail sinkhole mechanism to trap outgoing emails in Section 4.4.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we presented our honeypot system that can monitor the activity of
cybercriminals who gain illicit access to Gmail accounts. Our system is publicly
available to encourage researchers to set up additional experiments and improve
the knowledge of our community regarding what happens to stolen webmail ac-
counts.18 We set up and ran experiments involving 100 honey accounts, leaked
them via paste sites, underground forums, and virtual machines infected with mal-
ware, and provided detailed analyses of the activity of cybercriminals and other vis-
itors to the accounts. Our findings will help the research community to gain better
understanding of the ecosystem of stolen online accounts, and potentially help re-
searchers and online services to develop better detection and mitigation systems to
make online accounts safer for everyone.
18https://bitbucket.org/gianluca_students/gmail-honeypot
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Chapter 5
Stolen Social Accounts
5.1 Contributions
First, we devised a method to instrument and monitor compromised social network
accounts, following the general honey assets approach proposed earlier in Chap-
ter 3. Second, we created, instrumented, and deployed more than 1000 Facebook
accounts in our experimental setup, incorporating age range and gender variations
in the accounts, to observe resulting differences in accesses. Third, we present de-
tailed measurements and analyses of accesses and actions performed by visitors in
Facebook accounts, and shed light on what happens in stolen social accounts. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-scale Facebook honeypot to that ef-
fect. Our work in this chapter has won a “Secure the Internet” grant from Facebook.1
Collaborators. We express our heartfelt gratitude to Nektarios Leontiadis, De-
spoina Magka, and Mark Atherton (all in Facebook Inc.), henceforth referred to as
our Facebook contacts, for helping us to scale up experiments, especially during
the process of creating Facebook accounts. They also helped to establish friend
connections among the accounts. It is important to note that our Facebook con-
tacts did not share any proprietary data or methods with us before, during, or after
experiments.
1https://research.fb.com/facebook-awards-more-than-800000-in-secure-the-internet-
grants/
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5.2 Overview
Social accounts are almost indispensable in our daily lives. Discovering old and
new friends on Facebook, curating news on Twitter, and securing the next job on
LinkedIn are a few of the many activities that social accounts facilitate. It goes with-
out saying that individuals, businesses, and other entities find social accounts useful
for personal and commercial purposes. Like other types of online accounts, social
accounts accumulate personal information, sentimental value, and sometimes, fi-
nancial value, over time. Compared to webmail accounts (studied in Chapter 4),
social accounts provide features that transcend messaging.
How much latent value exists in a social account? Honan, staff at Wired Mag-
azine, learned the answer to that question in a terrifying way. In 2012, he was the
victim of a chain of attacks by hackers that sought to take over his Twitter account.
His Google and Apple ID accounts were also stolen during the attacks in which
he lost a lot of data.2 This clearly highlights the value of social accounts. It also
emphasises the importance of understanding what attracts cybercriminals to social
accounts and what they do within the accounts after breaking in. This knowledge
will help social network service providers to develop better detection and mitigation
systems.
Other problems plaguing social network platforms and their users include the
proliferation of misinformation and disinformation (also known as fake news) [112,
111, 113], fake accounts (also known as Sybils) [109], and hate speech and cy-
berbullying [50], among others. However, we do not study those problems in this
chapter. Instead, we focus on the problem of data breaches, specifically, credential
theft. We aim to understand what happens to social accounts after cybercriminals
acquire credentials to those accounts through illicit means. In other words, we seek
to understand their accesses and the actions they perform in the accounts. This will
help the security community in two ways. First, we will shed light on an understud-
ied domain (it is hard to study compromised accounts without being in control of a
2https://www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/
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large online service, hence academic literature is sparse in this area). Second, our
findings will help online services to tune and improve their detection and mitigation
tools.
To this end, we built a system to understand what happens to Facebook accounts
post-compromise, by leveraging the general honey assets method in Chapter 3. We
then created and deployed 1008 realistic decoy Facebook accounts (for ethical rea-
sons, it is not possible for us to study accounts that belong to real persons, to avoid
harming them). To lure visitors into interacting with the accounts, we leaked cre-
dentials of a subset of the accounts on the Surface Web and Dark Web, mimicking
the modus operandi of cybercriminals that distribute stolen account credentials. We
monitored the accounts for one month, extracted comprehensive activity records of
people visiting the accounts, and analysed those records offline.
We observed 215 unique accesses to 235 accounts that resulted in 478 actions
in those accounts. We show the different types of actions that visitors performed in
the accounts, and analyse the search terms they entered in the accounts (this re-
veals the type of content that they were interested in). We also show the content that
they posted in the accounts. Finally, we present the locations that logins originated
from, and describe the devices that connected to the accounts. These detailed mea-
surements paint a picture of the activity of visitors in Facebook accounts, and will be
useful in developing better tools and techniques to secure social accounts.
Research questions. Our research questions are as follows. Will differences in ac-
count demographics (age and gender) affect the activity of visitors in compromised
social accounts? How long do they stay in social accounts after logging in? What is
the nature of content that they search for in social accounts? What is the nature of
content that they post in social accounts?
5.3 Background
In this section, we describe the features and functionalities of regular Facebook
accounts and a special type of sandboxed Facebook accounts.
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5.3.1 Facebook accounts
A potential Facebook user first creates an account and an associated profile. Af-
terwards, they can send friend requests to their peers. They can post updates on
their profile timeline, for instance, by writing text, uploading a photo, or posting a
URL (or a combination of those actions). Facebook also allows users to send pri-
vate messages to their friends via Messenger (Facebook’s messaging application).
Users can click like (and other reactions) on posts, photos, and other content of in-
terest to them. Facebook usage is not limited to individual users. Informal groups,
businesses, and corporate entities can also maintain Facebook presence by creat-
ing pages and groups. Users can search for, and connect to, friends, groups, and
pages they are interested in. These features, among others, highlight the social
nature of Facebook.
5.3.2 Whitehat accounts
In addition to regular accounts, Facebook provides sandboxed accounts that are
disconnected from regular accounts. These accounts, known as whitehat accounts,
have similar functionality and visual similarity to real accounts, but exist in an isolated
environment (a sandbox). Hence, they cannot connect to regular accounts. They
are often used for testing purposes, for instance, security vulnerability testing.3 Fig-
ure 5.1 shows the profile header of a whitehat account (one of the experimental
accounts deployed later in this chapter). It looks similar to the profile header of a
regular Facebook account. The inherent isolation of whitehat accounts makes them
particularly suitable for our studies into understanding malicious activity in compro-
mised social accounts, since it ensures that real users will not be harmed in any
way during experiments, and this matches our ethics requirement4 for studies of
this nature. We discuss these ethical considerations in Section 5.4.5.
Facebook also provides a dashboard for managing whitehat accounts. The dash-
board, which is accessible only from a real Facebook account, allows the account
3https://www.facebook.com/whitehat/info/
4Recall our ARMER requirements in Chapter 3. “E” stands for ethical.
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Figure 5.1: This is the profile header of a whitehat account. Similar to a regular
Facebook account, it features a profile photo, the name of the account owner, and
additional information about the account.
Figure 5.2: Facebook’s whitehat dashboard allows the manager of whitehat ac-
counts to reset passwords of accounts under their control.
manager to reset passwords of whitehat accounts under their control. Figure 5.2
shows an example whitehat dashboard.
5.3.3 Download Your Information (DYI)
A Facebook user may desire to download and review their own account data and ac-
tivity. To facilitate this, Facebook accounts present a built-in tool known as Download
Your Information (DYI)5 which allows users to request and download a compressed
archive containing their account data and activity over time. Alternatively, this data
can be downloaded in JavaScript Object Notation format (JSON). The DYI tool is
5https://www.facebook.com/help/1701730696756992
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Figure 5.3: An example home page in an uncompressed DYI archive downloaded
from one of our honey accounts. It is organised in clickable sections – the user can
click through those sections to view detailed information about them.
available via the Settings menu of Facebook accounts.
After requesting and downloading the compressed archive (DYI archive), the
user can then uncompress the archive offline and peruse its contents. It is usually
structured like an offline web site organised in directories (sections) and web pages
that can be viewed offline in a web browser. Those pages contain detailed account
and activity records about the user, for instance, uploaded photos, IP addresses, and
private messages. Figure 5.3 shows an example home page in an uncompressed
DYI archive downloaded from one of our honey accounts. It is organised in clickable
sections – the user can click through those sections to view detailed information
about them.
Given the wealth of activity information and account data present in DYI archives,
they play a central role in the honeypot infrastructure presented in this chapter, as
explained further in Section 5.4.2. In other words, we rely on DYI functionality in
Facebook accounts to retrieve activity data from honey accounts at the end of ex-
periments.
87
5.4 Method and experimental setup
In this section, we describe our honey accounts. We also present the data collection
infrastructure that retrieves and processes data from honey accounts.
5.4.1 Setting up honey accounts
Demographics. Le´vesque et al. [64] examined gender and age, among other
demographic factors, as risk factors in malware infections. Inspired by their ap-
proach, we designed personas around two demographic attributes, namely age
range (teen/adult) and gender (male/female). We wanted to observe differences
or similarities in the behaviour of visitors to the honey accounts, depending on the
demographic attributes of the accounts. To this end, we created 1008 profiles in
total, comprising equal numbers of female adult, male adult, female teen, and male
teen accounts.
Profile names and passwords. We assigned first and last names to the profiles by
generating random combinations of names using the API of Random User Genera-
tor.6 We then assigned passwords to the profiles by randomly selecting passwords
from the publicly available RockYou password list, comprising 32 million passwords
that were exposed during a December 2009 data breach.7 Finally, we created 1008
Facebook whitehat accounts based on the profiles described earlier. To increase the
realism of the accounts, we established friend connections among them to mimic the
social nature of real Facebook accounts.
Profile photos. We sourced profile photos for the accounts by downloading Cre-
ative Commons (CC) stock photos from Pixabay,8 Flickr,9 Pexels,10 andUnsplash.11
We chose only CC0-licensed photos from those sources, that is, the photos that can
be used for any purpose (they also do not require attribution). We manually matched
6https://randomuser.me/
7https://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/21/lame_passwords_exposed_by_rockyou_hack/
8https://pixabay.com/
9https://www.flickr.com/
10https://www.pexels.com/
11https://unsplash.com/
88
photos to accounts, taking care to ensure that each profile photo represented the
previously designated demographic attributes of its host account. For instance, for a
female adult account, we chose a profile photo that shows an adult woman. Finally,
we uploaded the curated profile photos to honey accounts using a photo upload au-
tomation tool that we built for this purpose. Thus, at a glance, the demographic label
of any given account can be inferred by anyone that connects to the account.
Timeline data. To further mimic real Facebook accounts, we posted some con-
tent on the timelines of honey accounts. To this end, we collected publicly available
tweets containing popular hashtags using the Twitter Streaming API.12 These pop-
ular hashtags, identified in previous work [6], include #sports, #music, and #news,
among others. We removed personally identifiable information (PII) from the tweets
and wrote the sanitised text snippets on timelines of honey accounts using an au-
tomation tool that we built for this purpose. Hence, the honey accounts display
diverse content on topics that people usually post on social networks, and are more
convincing, as a result. We also considered populating the accounts with popu-
lar song lyrics, but discarded the idea because of copyright restrictions on musical
lyrics.
5.4.2 Data collection infrastructure
In this section, we present the data collection infrastructure that we built to retrieve
activity data from honey accounts.
DYI feature. As described earlier, Facebook accounts, including whitehat accounts,
provide a feature for account owners to download a compressed archive containing
comprehensive records of their activity on Facebook. We rely on this feature to col-
lect activity records of visitors to honey accounts. Hence, at the end of experiments,
we downloaded each account’s DYI archive and parsed it offline. We then analysed
this data to gain insight into the modus operandi of visitors to compromised social
accounts.
12https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs
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DYI archive parser. As stated earlier, DYI archives comprise web pages containing
activity details for offline viewing. We built a parser to automatically extract and
categorise the data presented in those web pages. Some of these details include
login and logout information, device information, and password changes, among
others.
Account health inspector. Visitors sometimes hijack honey accounts during ex-
periments by changing the passwords of such accounts. It is therefore necessary to
keep track of the health status of accounts, to know the ones that are still accessible
and the ones that have been hijacked (in other words, unhealthy ). To this end, we
developed a tool (account health inspector) to periodically connect to all our honey
accounts and report their statuses. This inspector connects to each account, nav-
igates to its activity log page, and records that page for offline parsing. Note that
this is different from fetching a DYI archive. The inspector allows us to check two
things. First, we can verify that the accounts are healthy, and carry out remedial
actions otherwise, for instance, by resetting their passwords through the whitehat
dashboard. Second, the recorded activity provides some information about actions
in the accounts, but it is not as comprehensive as a DYI archive. Nevertheless, it
gives early insights into activity in the accounts, pending DYI downloads at the end
of experiments.
Email notifications. While setting up whitehat accounts, we associated certain
email addresses to the honey accounts. Those email addresses point to a mail
server under our control. On that mail server, we receive real-time email notifica-
tions from honey accounts about password changes, incoming friend requests, and
received private messages, among others.
In summary, DYI archives, account health inspector reports, and email notifica-
tions from the honey accounts provide us with a comprehensive view of honey ac-
counts. Figure 5.4 shows the interconnections among the above listed components
of our data collection infrastructure.
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Figure 5.4: Social honeypot infrastructure. Honey accounts report activity records
to us via the DYI downloader, mail server, and health inspector.
5.4.3 Leaking honey credentials
Stolen credentials are often distributed on paste sites and other outlets by cyber-
criminals [91]. Hence, we mimicked the credential-leaking approach to attract cy-
bercriminals to our honey accounts by leaking their credentials via paste sites on
the Surface Web and the Dark Web (see details in Table 5.1). These paste sites are
ideal outlets because they allow public pastes and show recent pastes to all visitors.
Besides, paste sites have successfully attracted visitors to honey assets in previous
work [76, 62, 16].
We did not leak the entire population of honey accounts. Instead, we leaked
two-thirds of them, in other words, only 672 credentials out of the entire set of 1008
credentials. We did this to observe if visitors will attempt to compromise the accounts
that were not leaked by leveraging existing friend connections among the accounts.
For instance, they might send phishing messages or malicious links to accounts that
we did not leak.
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Table 5.1: To lure visitors to honey accounts, we leaked account credentials through
paste sites on the Surface Web and the Dark Web. We chose these paste sites be-
cause they allow public pastes and successfully attracted visitors to honey accounts
in previous work [76, 62, 16].
Name Type URL
Pastebin Surface Web https://pastebin.com/
Paste.org.ru Surface Web http://paste.org.ru/
Stronghold Dark Web (via TOR) http://nzxj65x32vh2fkhk.onion/
Given the large number of credentials that we leaked (672 accounts), we divided
them into seven chunks, each chunk comprising a maximum of 100 credentials.
Note that the recent pastes feature of paste sites imposes a fading effect on the
visibility of leaks. Hence, to ensure that our leaks favour paste site visitors from
multiple timezones that differ from ours, we leaked credentials twice daily. Finally, to
ensure that the credentials were adequately exposed during leaks, we randomised
the order of credentials in each chunk prior to leaking them. Our assumption is that
most visitors that see the leaks will pay more attention to credentials at the top of
each chunk than the ones that appear later in the chunk. To compensate for this
potential effect, we ensured that the credentials appeared in a different (random)
sequence in each leak instance. This has an unintended positive effect — each leak
instance appears unique to the human eye due to the random order of elements.
5.4.4 Threats to validity
We acknowledge that there are some factors that may affect the validity of our find-
ings. First, the content of the honey accounts comprise stock photos and other
publicly available data, which might be obvious under close scrutiny. Also, a close
look might reveal that the honey accounts were created fairly recently — this can
possibly influence the credibility of our accounts. Second, recall that we used sand-
boxed accounts (whitehat accounts) that are disconnected from regular Facebook
accounts. A close observation may reveal the presence of features that differ slightly
from real accounts. However, this does not pose a major risk to experiments. Third,
we leaked credentials through paste sites only. Our findings may not be represen-
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tative of malicious activity in social accounts stolen via other outlets, for instance,
malware or underground forums. Despite these factors, this chapter offers insights
into malicious activity in stolen social accounts and will help in developing detection
and mitigation systems and techniques.
5.4.5 Ethics
We carefully considered the ethical implications of this study while setting up and
running experiments. First, we used accounts that are isolated from regular Face-
book accounts to avoid harming legitimate Facebook users. This sandboxing ap-
proach is in line with common practices in malware research, which is related to our
work [82]. Second, we used publicly available stock photos and tweets to populate
the accounts. We did this to ensure that no private information was leaked in this
study. Third, by leveraging the whitehat dashboard, we ensured that account pass-
words could be changed easily by us, to lock visitors out, if we observed attempts
to harm people via honey accounts. Fourth, we asked our Facebook contacts to
keep an eye on the accounts with a view to shutting down any account that violates
Facebook’s policies during experiments. Finally, since our experiments involved de-
ceiving criminals to interact with decoy accounts, we sought and obtained ethics
approval from UCL prior to starting experiments.
5.5 Data analysis
In this section, we provide an overview of the activity of visitors in honey accounts.
In detail, we discuss the types of accesses that visitors made to the accounts and
show differences in account activity. We also summarise the system configuration of
observed accesses (browsers, operating systems, and IP addresses of the devices
that connected to the accounts).
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Figure 5.5: This is an example of a defective honey account. It presents an infinite
spinning GIF, indicating page load, but never loads content. It was impossible to
download DYI archives from defective honey accounts, hence we excluded them
from data analysis.
5.5.1 Discarding defective accounts
As described in Section 5.4.2, our data collection process involves downloading DYI
archives from all honey accounts. While downloading those archives, we discovered
that 158 accounts were defective. They presented spinning GIFs, indicating infinite
page load, instead of presenting page content. It was impossible to download DYI
archives from those accounts so we excluded them from data analysis. Figure 5.5
shows an example of a defective account. We have reached out to our Facebook
contacts to look into the accounts. The presence of defective accounts reduced the
effective number of honey accounts under analysis from 1008 to 850 fully functional
accounts. These functional accounts comprise 428 adult accounts and 422 teen
accounts (from the age range point of view), or 427 female accounts and 423 male
accounts (from the gender point of view). Finally, the effective number of (functional)
leaked accounts reduced from 672 to 569 (after excluding the defective accounts).
5.5.2 Accesses and associated actions
Facebook accounts record unique accesses to accounts, and each access is la-
belled with a unique string identifier known as a cookie. Cookies can be found in the
login records section of DYI archives. An access is recorded when a visitor connects
to a honey account. Note that access identifiers (cookies) can persist across logins
into different accounts. For instance, if a visitor connects to account A and then
connects to another account B using the same device and browser within a short
time, the same cookie will be recorded in both accounts. After logging in, a visitor
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performs zero or more actions, for instance, sending a private message or writing a
status update. In other words, an access results in zero or more actions in a honey
account. In this chapter, we use the terms cookie and access interchangeably. We
observed various types of accesses in the accounts and named them according to
the action(s) they performed in the accounts. These types of accesses, codified into
a taxonomy of accesses, are described next.
5.5.3 Taxonomy of accesses
As earlier mentioned, accesses can be described by the action(s) linked to them.
We observed the following types of accesses in honey accounts. Note that we have
more access types listed here, for Facebook accounts, than Gmail accounts (pre-
sented in Chapter 4). This is because social accounts present more features and
nuance than webmail accounts.
Curious. A curious access is recorded when a visitor connects to a honey account
and does nothing. This implies that the visitor was likely just checking to see that
accounts are real. In other words, a curious access has no associated action.
Hijacker. A hijacker access is recorded when the password of a honey account (or
its email address) is changed.
Chatty. This type of access is recorded when a visitor sends private messages,
creates group chats, posts an update on the timeline of another account, or posts
on its own timeline.
Emotional. An emotional access is recorded during clicks on a Facebook “like”
button (or any other reaction) on photos and posts.
Gold digger. This type of access is recorded when a visitor enters search terms in
the search bar.
Profile editor. Profile editor accesses are recorded when a visitor edits the pro-
file of a honey account (for instance, by changing the profile photo or other profile
information about the account owner).
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Table 5.2: Summary of actions in honey accounts grouped by access type. Note that
the curious type is excluded from this table. This is because curious accesses do
not perform any action in honey accounts. Gold digger and friend modifier accesses
are responsible for the vast majority of recorded actions (they account for 47% and
22% of all actions respectively).
Access type Number of actions Percentage
Gold digger 224 46.86
Friend modifier 104 21.76
Chatty 90 18.83
Hijacker 31 6.49
Profile editor 15 3.14
Emotional 14 2.93
Total 478 100.00
Friend modifier. This type of access is recorded when a visitor adds or removes a
friend from a honey account.
These types of accesses are not mutually exclusive, except for the curious type.
A single access with one or more actions can have one or more access types, ex-
cluding the curious type, which is reserved for accesses that do not have any associ-
ated action. For instance, an access that is chatty can also be emotional, depending
on its actions.
5.5.4 Actions
In total, we observed 215 unique accesses to 235 accounts, which resulted in 478
actions in those accounts. Table 5.2 shows a summary of actions grouped by access
type. Recall that a unique access can be responsible for zero or more actions.
Table 5.2 excludes accesses of the curious type since they are not responsible for
any action. Gold digger and friend modifier accesses dominate the table of actions,
responsible for 47% and 22% of all actions respectively. Profile editor and emotional
accesses are the least active types. This shows that visitors are mostly interested
in searching for information through the Facebook search bar (details can be found
in Section 5.5.7), and adding or removing friends from accounts. Next, we study
the timing of activity in honey accounts, with particular emphasis on how long the
recorded accesses stayed connected to the accounts.
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5.5.5 Timing of account activity
We set out to understand the time patterns of accesses to accounts. To this end,
we measured how long it took visitors to connect to the accounts after we leaked
account credentials, and how long they stayed connected to the accounts. These
measurements were carried out across all accounts, and also on groups of accounts
(by age range and gender), to observe differences in activity patterns across differ-
ent types of accounts. We present detailed measurements next.
Leaks to logins. Recall that we leaked credentials of honey accounts via paste
sites to attract visitors to them. To observe how long it took them to connect to
accounts after the leaks, we computed time lags between the first leak and the first
login (access) recorded in each account. Note that account credentials were leaked
simultaneously multiple times. In this analysis, we focused on the first leak (dated 1st
June, 2018). As the CDF in Figure 5.6 shows, accounts were mostly not accessed
instantly. Instead, visitors connected to them gradually for several days after the first
leak. 40% of the accounts were accessed in 350 hours or less, after the first leak (in
other words, within 15 days).
Access duration. To understand how long visitors stayed in honey accounts, we
computed the durations of their accesses. To achieve this, we recorded the time
that a cookie first appeared in an account as t0, and the last time it appeared in
that account as tlast. Given this information, access duration can be computed as
tlast   t0 for each access. Figure 5.7 shows CDFs of access duration grouped by
access type. Curious and emotional accesses tend to be short-lived compared to
the remaining types of accesses that stay connected to the accounts for longer pe-
riods of time. The CDFs in Figure 5.7 corroborate Table 5.2 — gold digger, friend
modifier, and chatty accesses spend more time in accounts and are responsible for
more actions than emotional and hijacker accesses, for instance. We also computed
access durations by age range to see if there were differences in access durations
in adult accounts compared to teen accounts. The CDFs in Figure 5.8 show that
visitors spend slightly more time in teen accounts than adult accounts. Finally, we
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Figure 5.6: CDF of the time difference between the first instance of credential leaks
(across all outlets) and first connections made to accounts by visitors. 40% of the
leaked accounts were accessed within 350 hours or less (in other words, within 15
days).
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Table 5.3: We conducted KS tests to compare access durations for each access
type to all access types combined.
Type (access durations) KS statistic P-value
Gold digger 0.3894438 0.0000618
Profile editor 0.8731884 0.0016149
Curious 0.1684783 0.0032443
Friend modifier 0.3826087 0.0058528
Chatty 0.3905797 0.0183591
Hijacker 0.2457181 0.4853071
Emotional 0.2862319 0.7395308
computed access durations by gender, to see if there were differences in access
durations in female accounts compared to male accounts. The CDFs in Figure 5.9
show that visitors spend slightly more time in female accounts than male accounts.
Statistical tests. To test the statistical significance of differences in access duration
by type, age range, and gender, we relied on the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test. The null hypothesis is that both samples under examination belong to
identical statistical distributions. The output of the test is a KS statistic and p-value.
A small KS statistic or high p-value shows that we cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis. First, we tested the access durations of each access type against all access
durations, to see the access types for which we can reject the null hypothesis. As
Table 5.3 shows, gold digger accesses differ most from the distribution of all ac-
cesses (in other words, we can clearly reject the null hypothesis), while emotional
accesses differ least (we cannot reject the null hypothesis).
Next, we set out to determine whether adult and teen access durations belong to
the same distribution or not (null hypothesis — adult and teen access duration vec-
tors belong to the same distribution; statistic=0.055, p-value=0.992, cannot reject
null hypothesis). Likewise, we conducted another KS test to see if the female and
male access duration vectors belong to the same distribution or not (null hypoth-
esis — female and male access duration vectors belong to the same distribution;
statistic=0.102, p-value=0.532, cannot reject null hypothesis). In both tests, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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(a) All hours. (b) First hour only (in minutes).
Figure 5.7: CDFs of access duration per access type. 5.7a shows the entire duration
of experiments while 5.7b shows the first hour only. To enhance the visibility of the
curves, the y-axis of 5.7a shows only the 60th to the 100th percentile ticks, while
5.7b shows all percentile ticks. Curious and emotional accesses tend to be short-
lived compared to the remaining types of accesses that stay logged in longer.
(a) All hours. (b) First hour only (in minutes).
Figure 5.8: CDFs of access duration per age range. 5.8a shows the entire duration
of experiments while 5.8b shows the first hour only. They show that visitors spend
slightly more time in teen accounts than adult accounts. To enhance the visibility of
the curves, the y-axis of 5.8a displays only the 60th to the 100th percentile ticks.
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(a) All hours. (b) First hour only (in minutes).
Figure 5.9: CDFs of access duration per gender. 5.9a shows the entire duration
of experiments while 5.9b shows the first hour only. To enhance the visibility of the
curves, the y-axis of 5.9a shows only the 60th to the 100th percentile ticks. The
CDFs show that visitors spend more time in female accounts than male accounts.
5.5.6 Further demographic analysis
We wanted to understand differences in the types of accesses recorded in the ac-
counts per age range and gender. To this end, we calculated the proportions of ac-
cess types in each range range and gender. As Figure 5.10 shows, teen accounts
present more chatty and emotional accesses than adult accounts, while adult ac-
counts show more friend modifier accesses than teen accounts. Figure 5.11 shows
that female accounts present more friend modifier accesses than male accounts
(proportionally). Male accounts present some profile editor accesses, while female
accounts present none. Finally, male accounts present more chatty and gold digger
accesses than female accounts.
Having observed many instances of friend requests among honey accounts dur-
ing experiments, we decided to study differences in friend request behaviour among
the accounts. To this end, we plotted CDFs of received friend requests (with empha-
sis on age range and gender). Figure 5.12 shows that female accounts receive a few
more friend requests than male accounts. Similarly, we observed minor differences
in received friend requests in adult and teen accounts.
Statistical tests. To test the statistical significance of the minor differences in re-
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Figure 5.10: Types of accesses per age range. Teen accounts present more chatty
and emotional accesses than adult accounts, while adult accounts show more friend
modifier accesses than teen accounts.
ceived friend requests by age range and gender, we once again performed the two-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Recall that the output of the test is a KS statis-
tic and p-value. A small KS statistic or high p-value shows that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis. The first KS test was to determine if received friend requests in
adult and teen accounts belong to the same distribution or not (null hypothesis —
adult and teen vectors of received friend requests belong to the same distribution;
statistic=0.010, p-value=1.000). Likewise, we conducted another KS test to see if
the female and male vectors of received friend requests belong to the same distribu-
tion or not (null hypothesis — female and male vectors of received friend requests
belong to the same distribution; statistic=0.063, p-value=0.359). In both tests, the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
5.5.7 What gold diggers seek
As shown in Table 5.2, gold digger accesses were responsible for a substantial
share of actions in honey accounts (47%). Various search terms were recorded in
52 accounts (those search terms were entered in the Facebook search bar of honey
accounts). To understand what visitors were searching for, we analysed the search
logs in DYI archives and found many varieties of search terms.
102
Figure 5.11: Types of accesses per gender. Female accounts present more friend
modifier accesses than male accounts (proportionally). Male accounts present
some profile editor accesses while female accounts present none. Also, male ac-
counts present more chatty and gold digger accesses than female accounts.
(a) Per age range. (b) Per gender.
Figure 5.12: CDFs showing the distribution of received friend requests. 5.12b shows
that female accounts received more friend requests than male accounts, while 5.12a
indicates minor differences in the number of received friend requests in teen and
adult accounts. Note that both plots display only very high percentile ticks, for visi-
bility reasons.
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Table 5.4: Top ten words among the search terms entered in honey accounts. These
include atheism- and religion-related words in Spanish (or Portuguese) as a result of
a visitor’s numerous searches for debates on atheism and religion. Other interesting
search terms that showed up include “india vs england live” and “bin carding.”
Searched words TF-IDF
debates 0.4293
ateı´smo 0.3578
bihar 0.3578
religio˜es 0.3220
robson 0.2326
india 0.1431
oaxaca 0.1252
salina 0.1252
cruz 0.1252
fajar 0.1252
We relied on Term Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF),13 a nat-
ural language processing metric, to analyse the search logs, similar to our approach
in previous work [76, 16]. Given a text corpus, TF-IDF ranks words in the corpus by
assigning weights to them, between 0 and 1. Words weighted close to 1 are more
important in the corpus than words weighted close to 0. To observe the top words
that visitors searched for in the accounts, we used TF-IDF to obtain the top 10 words
in the search logs as shown in Table 5.4. They include atheism- and religion-related
words in Spanish (or Portuguese) as a result of a visitor’s numerous searches for
debates on atheism and religion. Other interesting search terms that showed up
in search logs include “india vs england live,” “bin carding,” and “marvel cinematic
universe.” These search terms reveal the presence of a wide variety of benign and
malicious interests in search terms. Note that word stemming was not applied during
this analysis because the corpus contained a mixture of words in multiple languages.
Stemming is best done on a corpus of text in a single language.
5.5.8 (Anti)social chatter
Recall that Table 5.2 shows that chatty accesses were responsible for 19% of all
recorded actions. What did chatty visitors post in honey accounts? We observed
13Chapter 4 contains a detailed mathematical explanation of TF-IDF.
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Table 5.5: Top ten words extracted from the text corpus comprising comments, pri-
vate messages, and posts made in the honey accounts. Greetings showed up in the
corpus (“hello” and “hi baby,” for instance). We also observed some posts alerting
account owners about data breaches (unknown to the posters, we leaked creden-
tials intentionally). Some visitors, in apparent moments of awareness, also posted
comments that our honey accounts were fake.
Chatty words TF-IDF
hi 0.3842
baby 0.2744
hii 0.2744
my 0.2744
you 0.2195
fake 0.1646
password 0.1646
am 0.1646
change 0.1646
better 0.1098
chatty behaviour in 29 accounts. These comprise attempted group calls, “waves,”
private messages, posts on own timeline and other timelines. Private messages
ranged from the “hello” and “hi” types to sexually explicit messages. Timeline posts
ranged from short meaningless posts to morbid posts (for instance, “killing my fam-
ily with an assault rifle from ww2”). There were some posts warning account own-
ers about data breaches including leaked credentials (unknown to the posters, we
leaked credentials intentionally). Finally, some comments stated that the accounts
were fake. Surprisingly, we did not observe any post containing phishing or malware-
laden links. To observe the top words in the chatty text corpus, we once again
applied the TF-IDF technique (previously described in Section 5.5.7). The top 10
chatty words are shown in Table 5.5. Note that we also did not perform stemming
because of the presence of multiple languages in the chatty text corpus.
5.5.9 System configuration of accesses
Leveraging the user-agent string information in DYI archives, we extracted browser
and operating system information from the observed accesses. A wide range of
browsers and operating systems were used to access honey accounts. Table 5.6
shows a summary of those browsers. Chrome and Android Browser top the list of
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browsers, at 36% and 29% respectively. A small percentage of accesses were made
using PhantomJS,14 a web automation tool. Table 5.6 shows that some connections
to honey accounts were made manually, while others were made automatically. Ta-
ble 5.7 shows an overview of the operating systems on the devices that connected
to honey accounts. Windows and Android dominate the list (55% and 34% respec-
tively). A small fraction of accesses were also made with iPhones.
5.5.10 On the origins of accesses
In total, we observed 209 IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6 addresses) from 47 coun-
tries. Of these IP addresses, 49 were TOR exit nodes. It is possible that some
of the remaining IP addresses were proxies or VPN nodes. To understand the ge-
ographical locations that accesses originated from, we extracted all IP addresses
associated with accesses from the DYI archives. We then carried out IP geoloca-
tion using IP-API,15 an IP geolocation service that provides timezone and location
information about IP addresses.
Figure 5.13 shows a world map with markers showing the locations that ac-
cesses originated from. As the map shows, connections originated from many lo-
cations around the world. It is interesting to note a particularly dense cluster of
accesses from Europe. No access originated from China — note that Facebook is
banned in China. It is possible that visitors connected to some accounts via proxies
or VPNs. However, we did not observe any evidence confirming or refuting this.
5.6 Interesting case studies
As shown in Section 5.5.9, many accesses were made via mobile devices (espe-
cially Android devices and iPhones). We observed three cases in which visitors (in-
advertently) synchronised their mobile phone contacts, comprising names, phone
numbers, and occasionally, email addresses, to our honey accounts. In the first ac-
14http://phantomjs.org/
15http://ip-api.com
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Table 5.6: Various browsers were used to connect to the accounts, including desk-
top and mobile variants. The presence of PhantomJS, a web automation tool,
shows that some accesses were made using automation tools. This wide variety
of browsers (including mobile browsers) reveals a mix of manual and automated
accesses.
Browser Percentage
Chrome 35.98
Android Browser 29.13
Firefox 26.95
Unknown Browser 2.34
Edge 2.34
Safari 2.02
Opera 0.62
Internet Explorer 0.31
PhantomJS 0.31
Total 100.00
Table 5.7: Distribution of operating systems in accesses to honey accounts. The vast
majority of accesses were made using Windows and Android devices. More than
one-third of accesses were made via mobile devices (Android and iOS devices).
OS Percentage
Windows 54.98
Android 33.80
Linux 4.05
MacOS 2.65
Unknown OS 2.65
iPhone iOS 1.87
Total 100.00
Figure 5.13: Origins of accesses determined via IP geolocation. Each marker in-
dicates the origin of a connection to a honey account. Connections were made to
honey accounts from many locations around the world. There is a dense cluster of
accesses that originated from Europe. No accesses originated from China — recall
that Facebook is banned in China.
107
count, we observed a contact list comprising 830 phone contacts. The country code
prefix (+91) of the phone numbers indicates that the phone numbers are domiciled
in India. In the second account, we observed a different contact list comprising 57
contacts, once again domiciled in India (country code prefix +91). In the third ac-
count, we observed yet another contact list comprising 27 Mexican phone contacts
(country code prefix +52).
For ethical reasons, we did not investigate the identities associated with these
phone numbers or their relationships with the visitors that connected to the honey
accounts and synchronised their phone contacts. In other words, it is possible to
potentially unmask them and their personal networks, but we decided against doing
so, for ethical reasons. A wider implication of this observation is that visitors (and
other actors) can be tricked into exposing vital information (PII) about themselves if
they can be convinced to connect to honey accounts using their mobile devices. In
addition to the potential harm from PII leakage, this can be potentially damaging for
actors that intend to keep their own identities private (along with identities of people
in their networks), for example, journalists and politicians. The countermeasure is
simple — do not connect to untrusted accounts on personal mobile devices to avoid
PII leakage and associated problems.
Finally, two honey accounts were used to authenticate to Instagram, according to
the information we collected via DYI archives. This indicates the possibility of multi-
platform attacks — cybercriminals can compromise accounts on an online service
and then use those accounts to carry out further illicit activity on other services.
5.7 Summary
We presented a method to study compromised social accounts without being in
control of a large online service, and implemented and deployed our honeypot in-
frastructure on Facebook, one of the largest social network platforms. We showed
detailed measurements and analyses of accesses and actions of visitors connect-
ing to compromised Facebook accounts under our control. We also explored dif-
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ferences in visitor behaviour across two demographic attributes of social accounts,
namely age range and gender. Finally, we presented our findings on the origins of
accesses and devices that connected to the accounts. Our approach to studying so-
cial accounts can be deployed by researchers to study other problems facing social
accounts, for instance, demographic risk factors in cyberbullying, which is one of the
persistent problems facing users of social accounts.
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Chapter 6
Compromised Cloud Documents
6.1 Contributions
First, we introduced some improvements to the cloud document monitor infrastruc-
ture originally proposed in a 2016 USENIX workshop paper [62], following the gen-
eral honey assets method presented in Chapter 3. Second, to understand what hap-
pens to compromised cloud documents, we created, instrumented, and leaked 100
decoy Google spreadsheets comprising 1000 financial records of fictional individu-
als. We henceforth refer to them as sheets. For comparison, only five decoy sheets
were deployed in the pilot study [62]. In other words, we scaled up experiments by
a factor of 20 in this chapter. Third, we present detailed measurements and analy-
ses of resulting activity in the sheets, and provide insights into what happens within
compromised cloud documents. The findings in this chapter will help researchers
to understand what happens to compromised cloud documents and help providers
of cloud services to understand ways to secure accounts and assets on such cloud
services.
Collaborators. We express our appreciation to Martin Lazarov (erstwhile UCL stu-
dent) for implementing and testing the first version of our cloud document monitor
system under the supervision of Gianluca Stringhini and the author of this thesis.
The idea of a cloud document monitor was conceived by the author while its initial
implementation was assigned to Martin Lazarov, and he did an excellent job. After-
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wards, the author implemented some improvements to the cloud document monitor
system and performed a large-scale experiment on compromised cloud documents.
This chapter presents the results of that large-scale experiment.
6.2 Overview
It is hard to imagine life nowadays without online accounts, for instance, webmail
accounts for business and personal communication, e-commerce accounts for on-
line shopping, and cloud storage accounts for convenient document storage and
sharing.
Cloud documents can help to increase the productivity of teams in organisations
by allowing them to collaborate easily and edit documents in real time without re-
quiring their physical presence. As of 2014, 21% of EU citizens relied on cloud
accounts to store their documents.1 This shows the widespread adoption of cloud
storage platforms, for instance, Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft OneDrive.
However, there is a downside to the use of cloud accounts. Like most other
online accounts, cloud accounts often accumulate sensitive information over time,
for instance, financial and personal secrets. This makes them attractive targets to
cybercriminals seeking to steal and monetise such sensitive information [91]. It is
therefore important for researchers and cloud service providers to study and un-
derstand what happens to compromised cloud accounts and the documents they
guard, as one of the necessary steps towards securing such accounts. It is hard to
study attacker behaviour in online accounts unless one is in control of a large online
service (as discussed in Chapter 2). Hence, there is limited research literature in
this space. This research gap motivated the work presented in this chapter, with
specific focus on understanding compromised cloud documents.
Previous work has shown that cybercriminals target online accounts and ser-
vices to steal financial information from them, and trade stolen information via var-
ious outlets [49]. Such financial information includes payment card information,
1https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_and_cloud_
services_-_statistics_on_the_use_by_individuals
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cryptocurrency wallets, and online banking details. In recent times, there has been
massive public interest in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies such as
Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Litecoin, which provide alternative means of facilitating on-
line transactions, among other uses. However, the advent of cryptocurrencies also
introduced a new wave of cybercriminals that steal digital money (cryptocurrency
wallets), sometimes leading to huge losses, as seen in the 2014 high-profile attack
on a cryptocurrency exchange known as Mt. Gox ($460 million in losses).2
To understand what happens to compromised cloud documents containing fi-
nancial information, we created decoy documents and inserted fake traditional bank
payment information and cryptocurrency details in them. In other words, following
the general honey assets method proposed in Chapter 3, we set up 100 fake payroll
sheets comprising comprising 1000 fake records of fictional individuals. We popu-
lated the sheets with fake traditional bank payment information, fake cryptocurrency
details, and fake payment links. We also installed scripts in the sheets to notify us
about the activity of visitors in them and configured fake payment links in the sheets
to record information about clicks on them. Unlike the pilot study [62] in which five
sheets were deployed, we conducted experiments on a much larger scale in this
chapter (100 sheets in total). Note that the pilot study [62] did not include any cryp-
tocurrency information unlike the work in this chapter. To lure cybercriminals and
other visitors into visiting the sheets, we leaked links pointing to the sheets via paste
sites. By doing so, we mimicked the modus operandi of cybercriminals that steal
and distribute stolen financial information online. This approach has been used suc-
cessfully in previous work by the author [76, 62, 16]. We then recorded accesses to
the sheets and tracked clicks on the fake payment URLs inside them.
Our research questions, related to the questions in the pilot study [62], are as
follows. First, which actions do cybercriminals carry out on compromised cloud doc-
uments? Second, in a given document, will there be differences in the interactions
of cybercriminals with different types of financial information, namely traditional bank
payment information and cryptocurrency information? Third, will cybercriminals at-
2https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/
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tempt to carry out further attacks outside the leaked documents, for instance, by
visiting payment URLs in the documents? Fourth, can we characterise the devices
that cybercriminals use to connect to stolen cloud documents?
We ran experiments for a month and collected data using the infrastructure pre-
sented in Section 6.4.2. We observed 235 accesses across 98 sheets. Two sheets
were not opened. We also recorded 38 modifications in 7 sheets. In Section 6.5,
we present detailed measurements and analysis of accesses, modifications, ed-
its, and devices that visited URLs in the sheets (with emphasis on IP addresses,
browsers, and operating systems). In summary, we present a comprehensive pic-
ture of what happens to compromised Google spreadsheets. The findings presented
in this chapter will help other researchers seeking to understand what happens to
stolen cloud documents and providers of cloud services looking to understand ways
to secure accounts and assets on those cloud services. This is essential because
our daily activities depend heavily on cloud services.
6.3 Background
In this section, we describe cloud documents, with specific focus on Google Sheets,
and explain why Google Sheets constitutes a good fit for our experiments in this
chapter.
6.3.1 Cloud documents
Word processing, desktop publishing, and data processing tasks, which are ever-
present business and personal tasks, can be carried out on local machines us-
ing desktop tools such as Microsoft Word, Scribus, and Apache OpenOffice Calc,
among others. It is also possible and easy to use cloud-based tools for such tasks.
They usually do not require complex installation processes unlike their desktop
counterparts. They also allow users to collaboratively edit documents from any lo-
cation unlike their desktop counterparts. Examples of cloud-based tools for creating
and editing cloud documents include Google Sheets, Microsoft Office 365, and Zoho
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Office Suite. These tools offer remote document hosting and editing services, and
are accessible via a web browser. Next, we describe Google Sheets, the cloud-
based platform that supported our experiments in this chapter.
6.3.2 Google Sheets
Here, we focus on Google Sheets, a cloud-based data processing tool that allows
users to create and modify sheets, and carry out data processing tasks on those
sheets. Google Sheets also enables users to extend the functionalities of their
sheets by incorporating scripts in them, leveraging the power of Google Apps Script3
(a scripting engine for building lightweight web applications and augmenting Google
Apps). This makes Google Sheets a good fit for the experiments in this chapter
since the embedded Google Apps Script engine allows us to instrument sheets to
“phone home” (report activity data), in line with requirements of the general honey
assets method proposed in Chapter 3. Google Apps Script (within Google Sheets)
thus plays an important role in the data collection module of the honeypot infrastruc-
ture instance presented in this chapter, similar to the one in Chapter 4 (we described
how Google Apps Script works in Section 4.3.2). In this chapter, our honeypot in-
frastructure relies on time-driven and event-driven triggers in a custom app hidden
in decoy documents, to track and report accesses and changes in those documents
to us. Note that this method can be applied to other types of online documents as
well, not just Google Sheets.
To create sheets, a user will first have to set up at least one Google account
to host sheets. Afterwards, the user can create new sheets via a web browser.
Alternatively, users can upload existing sheet data, for instance, comma-separated
values (CSV) files that already contain data formatted in rows and columns. Users
can edit cells in the sheets, delete rows and columns of cells, perform computations
and transformations on cells, and delete entire sheets, among other operations.
For collaborative purposes, the owner of a sheet can configure the sheet to allow
other users or visitors to view, comment on, or edit the sheet. Inviting collaborators
3https://developers.google.com/apps-script/overview
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Figure 6.1: One of the ways to share a sheet with collaborators is by generating a
long link that points to the sheet. In this example, anyone that knows the long link
(highlighted in grey) can view and edit this sheet. Alternatively, the sheet owner can
explicitly enter collaborators via the “People” field.
to such sheets usually involves explicitly granting them specific permissions (view
or edit). The sheet owner can also generate a long link that points to the sheet,
such that anyone that knows the long link can view or edit the sheet, depending on
the privilege level assigned to the long link. The sheet owner can then send the
long link to collaborators. They will visit the long link to gain access to the sheet.
Figure 6.1 shows an example of a sheet configuration setting that allows visitors
with knowledge of the long link to edit the sheet.
6.4 Method and experimental setup
In this section, we describe the process of creating and instrumenting honey sheets
prior to experiments, and how we exposed the sheets to cybercriminals. We also
describe the data collection infrastructure that powered experiments in this chapter.
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6.4.1 Creating honey sheets
To observe what happens in compromised cloud documents, we created sheets
containing two types of financial information, namely traditional bank payment in-
formation (bank account numbers and sort codes) and cryptocurrency information
(Bitcoin addresses). We designed the sheets to look like payroll spreadsheets in-
cluding salary information, following the approach employed in [62]. It is important
to note that the sheets in [62] did not include any cryptocurrency information, while
half of our sheets in this chapter did. Next, we describe honey sheet data in detail.
Fake data in cells. In total, we created 100 sheets for the experiments in this
chapter. Prior to creating them, we manually created 10 Google accounts to host
them, based on fake personal data that was generated using Random User Gener-
ator.4 Note that a similar approach was employed to generate fake personal data
for honey social accounts in Chapter 5. Next, we generated data to fill the rows
and columns of honey sheets. Using the same Random User Generator, we cre-
ated 1000 fake personal profiles. We then entered the first names and last names of
those profiles in the honey sheets. We also included salary information sourced from
Monster.co.uk,5 a website that provides job search, career advice, and salary infor-
mation to the general public. In half of the sheets, we inserted randomly-generated
fake banking information and inserted fake cryptocurrency information in the other
half. We did this to observe differences in accesses to documents that contain
traditional banking information compared to documents that contain cryptocurrency
information. To convert salary values from British Pound (GBP) to Bitcoin (XBT), we
relied on XE tool6 for currency conversion. We configured all sheets in a way that
visitors can edit them without authentication, in other words, anyone in possession
of a long link (described in Section 6.3.2) that points to a sheet can visit and edit
such a sheet.
Fake banking information. As mentioned earlier, we included traditional banking
4https://randomuser.me/
5https://www.monster.co.uk/career-advice/article/uk-average-salary-graphs
6https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/
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Figure 6.2: This sheet contains fake traditional bank payment information. Even
though bank names were not explicitly included in the spreadsheets, account num-
bers and sort codes were generated to appear similar to real bank accounts. Short
URLs (parts redacted) in the sheet point to nonexistent pages on websites of real
banks.
information in half of the sheets. We selected 5 popular UK banks, namely HSBC,
Lloyds Bank, Santander, Barclays, and Standard Chartered. We then generated
fake sort codes and bank account numbers corresponding to those banks, follow-
ing their conventions. For instance, HSBC sort codes have the form 40-xx-xx, and
Barclays 20-xx-xx, where xx stands for any number between 11 and 99. Figure 6.2
shows an example sheet containing fake banking information.
Fake Bitcoin addresses. We needed fake but realistic-looking cryptocurrency in-
formation for the other half of honey sheets. To this end, we generated fake Bitcoin
addresses following the specifications described on a Bitcoin wiki.7 Specifications
— most Bitcoin addresses comprise random digits and alphabets excluding char-
acters that can result in visual ambiguity, for instance, digit zero (0) and uppercase
letter O. The length of a Bitcoin address varies between 26 and 35 characters. In
addition, they usually start with 1, 3, or bc1. Following these specifications, we gen-
erated 500 fake Bitcoin addresses and included them in 50 sheets (Bitcoin sheets).
7https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address
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Figure 6.3: This sheet contains fake Bitcoin addresses in addition to other financial
information. To convert salary values from British Pound (GBP) to Bitcoin (XBT),
we relied on XE tool for currency conversion. Short URLs (parts redacted) point to
nonexistent pages on real cryptocurrency exchanges.
Figure 6.3 shows an example sheet containing fake Bitcoin addresses.
Honey URLs. To observe if visitors to the sheets were going to carry out attacks
on the “account owners” listed in the sheets, we included some fake payment URLs,
which we refer to as honey URLs, in the sheets. These honey URLs, which point
to nonexistent pages on bank websites and cryptocurrency exchanges, allow us to
track clicks on them. To track clicks, we leveraged the functionality that link shorten-
ers provide. Link shorteners are often used to generate short (and convenient and
easy-to-use) URLs that contain fewer characters than the original URL, yet point to
the original URL. Short URLs are handy on social networks since it is important to
keep posts, messages, and URLs as short as possible. Examples of link shorteners
include bit.ly, goo.gl (recently discontinued), and cutt.ly. By including short
URLs (honey URLs) in the sheets instead of actual destination URLs, we achieve
our goal of click tracking (via click analytics functionality provided by link shortening
services) and hide the true destination of honey URLs. See Table 6.1 for illustrative
examples of honey URLs. Visitors are compelled to click on honey URLs if they
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Original URL Honey URL
https://www.hsbc.co.uk/?passkey=d******** https://cutt.ly/C***
https://bittylicious.com/?auth=6******** https://cutt.ly/8***
http://[bouncy.domain]/banking-8102-f******** https://cutt.ly/J***
http://[bouncy.domain]/crypto-8102-1******** https://cutt.ly/w***
Table 6.1: Examples of honey URLs and the original URLs that were shortened to
derive them (parts redacted). Note that click analytics data can be retrieved from
all honey URLs, but additional information (such as IP addresses) can be retrieved
only in the case of honey URLs that point to the bouncy web server (bouncy.domain
stands in for the real domain that we used) explained in Section 6.4.2. Note that
the URLs in this table are illustrative examples only, they are not literal examples of
specific URLs that we included in the sheets.
wish to visit “payment pages” that they point to.8 In the pilot experiment on honey
sheets [62], goo.gl was used to shorten URLs and achieve click tracking. However,
goo.gl was discontinued recently by Google, so we opted for cutt.ly instead. We
briefly considered using bit.ly, another popular URL shortener, but it allows the
external public to easily de-obfuscate the destination URL by simply appending a
“+” to the short URL and visiting the resulting URL. In addition to revealing the des-
tination URL, this also exposes details of the short URL’s click analytics. Hence,
we opted for cutt.ly whose destination URLs are harder to de-obfuscate and also
provides private analytics. It provides a free click analytics dashboard and an API
that allows easy download of click analytics data.
This concludes the process of creating honey sheets and adding fake financial
data to them. Next, we describe the data collection infrastructure that we deployed
to monitor honey sheets.
6.4.2 Data collection
In this section, we present the honeypot infrastructure that was deployed to collect
data from honey sheets. We describe its components, what they do, and how they
interact. Figure 6.4 shows an overview of the honeypot infrastructure and we de-
scribe its key components next.
Safehouse webmail account. Similar to the approach employed in [62], we in-
8Alternatively, to visit honey URLs, visitors can copy and paste them in a web browser.
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Figure 6.4: Our updated honey sheets infrastructure. Some components, espe-
cially the bouncy web server, have been updated since the experiments in previous
work [62].
120
stalled scripts (Google Apps Script) in each sheet to report changes in the sheet
back to us via a dedicated safehouse webmail account. Precisely, the scripts send
notification emails containing periodic snapshots of sheets to the safehouse web-
mail account every 4 hours, by leveraging a time-driven Apps Script trigger. Also
included in those notification emails are the edits made by visitors (changes in sheet
state) between snapshots. We automatically record them by leveraging event-driven
triggers and writing those changes to Properties, a persistent buffer for storing sim-
ple key-value pairwise data.9 This approach (minimising the number of emails sent
from sheets by relying on an implicit buffer) helped us to avoid script failure by stay-
ing under Google’s quotas and limits (previously mentioned in Chapter 4, under Sec-
tion 4.3.2). Next, we retrieve those notification emails via an email client (IMAP) and
parse them to compare snapshots of sheets automatically. This allows us to record
differences in snapshots and changes in sheets over time. For instance, differences
in snapshots reveal modifications made to sheets by visitors (a modification involves
changing the structure of a sheet or editing its cells).
Honey URL analytics. As mentioned in Section 6.4.1, short URLs in honey sheets
provide information about clicks on them. This includes information about click origin
(country), click count, and device information (that is, the device that was used to
click on the link). We collected click analytics data once daily by leveraging cutt.ly
analytics API (recall that we used cutt.ly link shortener service to create honey
URLs), and stored it locally in JSON files for offline parsing.
Bouncy web server. cutt.ly analytics API provides useful click analytics data but
does not reveal IP addresses of people that visit honey URLs. To overcome this
limitation, we configured a third of the cutt.ly-generated honey URLs to point to
a custom web server under our control, otherwise known as a bouncy web server.
This web server enables us to record IP addresses and additional header informa-
tion (which short URL analytics do not provide). On receiving a request for a web
resource, the bouncy web server parses the request path and redirects the visitor to
9https://developers.google.com/apps-script/reference/properties/properties-service
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a bank website if the request path contains the token “banking-8102,” a cryptocur-
rency exchange website if the request path contains “crypto-8102,” or google.com if
the request path does not contain either of those tokens.10 Table 6.1 shows example
honey URLs that contain such tokens. The “bouncy” behaviour of the web server
helps to keep up the appearance of visiting “payment links” and hides the existence
of the bouncy web server.
Health inspector. To inspect the state of the honeypot system (to ensure that all
components work as expected), we periodically run the health inspector to check
that latest activity reports have been retrieved from the safehouse webmail account.
It also examines click analytics data for recency. Out-of-date data indicates that one
or more components of the honeypot infrastructure have failed. The health inspector
reported sound system health throughout the experiments in this chapter.
6.4.3 Leaking long links
Previous work has shown that cybercriminals often post samples of their loot via
online outlets usually to brag about their prowess or attract potential buyers [91].
Mimicking their modus operandi and following the general honey assets method
proposed in Chapter 3, we leaked long links pointing to the sheets (not to be con-
fused with honey URLs) on paste sites to lure cybercriminals to visit the sheets. To
avoid ambiguity, note that long links, for leaking, are of the form
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AX4ZDODx3J... while honey URLs,
included in sheet data, look like https://cutt.ly/B.... Figure 6.1 shows an exam-
ple of a long link that points to a sheet. We leaked long links via the same paste sites
employed in Chapter 5 (listed in Table 6.2). Note that paste sites have successfully
attracted visitors to honey assets in previous work [76, 62, 16] — this makes them
suitable for the experiments in this chapter. Each long link was leaked along with a
short description, for instance, “leaked payroll” or “bitcoin payment lists.” Recall that
we configured each sheet in a way that anyone can access and edit it, provided they
10In case the reader wonders what “8102” stands for in request paths, it has no special significance.
It is simply year “2018” written backwards.
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Table 6.2: To lure visitors to honey sheets, we leaked long links pointing to the sheets
through paste sites on the Surface Web and the Dark Web. We chose these paste
sites because they allow public pastes and have successfully attracted visitors to
honey assets in previous work [76, 62, 16].
Name Type URL
Pastebin Surface Web https://pastebin.com/
Paste.org.ru Surface Web http://paste.org.ru/
Stronghold Dark Web (via TOR) http://nzxj65x32vh2fkhk.onion/
know the long link that points to it.
Prior to leaking the 100 long links, we divided them into five chunks, each chunk
comprising 20 long links. We leaked all chunks twice daily to ensure good temporal
coverage on paste sites, thus compensating for timezone differences among visitors
to the paste sites. We also randomised the order of links in each chunk prior to
leaking, thus ensuring that each long link had a fair chance of being visited. After
leaking the long links, we recorded accesses to sheets and tracked clicks on honey
URLs inside them.
6.4.4 Threats to validity
We acknowledge that there are some factors that may affect the validity of our find-
ings. First, our honey sheet data comprises fake financial data, including fake Bitcoin
addresses, which may be obvious under close scrutiny, and can possibly influence
the behaviour of visitors. Second, our honey URLs (embedded in sheet data) are
short URLs, and short URLs are generally treated with suspicion. This may nega-
tively affect the perception of visitors to honey sheets. Third, we leaked long links
pointing to the sheets through paste sites only. Our findings may not be represen-
tative of malicious activity in cloud documents stolen via other outlets, for instance,
malware-laden endpoints or underground forums.
Finally, there is also the possibility that automated tools (crawlers) visited the
long links in addition to human visitors. This may affect the validity of our findings. To
mitigate this risk in future work, it is possible to incorporate an additional CAPTCHA-
like step in the process of accessing the sheets to ensure that only manual accesses
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by humans pass through. This can be achieved by leaking links that point to a
web domain under our control which will serve up an interstitial page containing
the CAPTCHA. If a visitor passes the CAPTCHA (and thus prove they are indeed
human), they will be redirected to the sheet that they were trying to access in the first
place. However, this approach may discourage visitors from proceeding because of
the increased cognitive workload that CAPTCHA solving involves.
Despite these concerns, this chapter offers insights into malicious activity in com-
promised cloud documents and presents new ways to study such activity.
6.4.5 Ethics
The experiments in this chapter involve deceiving cybercriminals into interacting
with cloud documents. In line with standard ethical practices, we took the follow-
ing precautions. First, we used fake financial data (randomly generated) in the
sheets. Thus, we ensured that no real person or account was harmed in our ex-
periments. Second, to avoid spamming other accounts, we did not leak credentials
of the Google accounts that hosted our honey sheets. We only leaked the long links
that point to honey sheets, thus limiting the possible harm that our experiments may
cause otherwise. Third, we obtained approval from UCL’s ethics committee prior to
running experiments.
6.5 Data analysis
In this section, we present an overview of our observations during experiments and
detailed measurements of visitor activity in honey sheets.
6.5.1 Activity overview
We conducted experiments from 11th July, 2018 until 14th August, 2018. During
this period, 98 sheets were opened 235 times. These sheets comprise 48 sheets
containing banking information and 50 sheets containing cryptocurrency informa-
tion. We recorded 38 modification events during which 7 sheets were modified by
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visitors. We observed 219 clicks on honey URLs. Those clicks originated from 30
countries.
6.5.2 What is a sheet access?
Unlike the studies presented in Chapter 4 (webmail accounts) and Chapter 5 (social
accounts) in which an access requires authenticating to an account using leaked
username and password information, we present a different definition of an access
in this chapter. By design, accessing any of our honey sheets does not require au-
thentication. Instead, the visitor requires knowledge of a long link that points to a
sheet (and we expose those long links by leaking them on paste sites, as explained
in Section 6.4.3). This makes it easier for visitors to access the honey sheets — all
they need to do is visit the long link. Hence, in this chapter, we define an access
as a file open event (in other words, a sheet open event). The downside of this
unauthenticated approach is that there are no strong unique identifiers of accesses
(in other words, no cookies, unlike Chapters 4 and 5 in which we recorded and anal-
ysed cookies). This also implies that we are unable to build a taxonomy of accesses
in this chapter, since doing so requires cookies. Finally, it is important to note that
spreadsheets present fewer functionalities than webmail accounts and social ac-
counts (hence, fewer measurements are possible). Nevertheless, we successfully
analysed open events and modification events, and tracked clicks on honey URLs in
the sheets. Next, we present our findings.
6.5.3 Timing of activity in sheets
Leak to first access. First, we set out to understand how long it took for visitors
to access the sheets after we leaked long links pointing to them. Let us denote
the time of first leak as tleak. For each opened sheet, we record the time of its
first open event (first access) as t0 and compute the time lag between leak and
first access as t0   tleak. Figure 6.5 shows a CDF of time lags. Less than 10%
of opened sheets were visited within the first 22 hours since first leak. However,
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accesses increased rapidly afterwards — by the 25th hour since first leak, 80% of
the sheets had been opened. It is possible that the initial time lags between first
leak and first accesses were due to reluctance of visitors to visit links, since links
can be potentially malicious, generally speaking. However, it is hard to explain the
rapid uptake that started around the 23rd hour since first leak.
Timeline of accesses. Next, we set out to understand the spatial patterns (with re-
spect to time) of all accesses during experiments. 98 sheets received 235 accesses.
These comprise 48 bank sheets and 50 cryptocurrency sheets. Let us denote the
time of a given access as ta and the time of first leak as tleak. For each access, we
computed its relative access time as ta tleak. We then plotted a timeline of accesses
(see Figure 6.6), with the time of first leak tleak as the reference point. Figure 6.6
corroborates our previous findings in Figure 6.5 — it shows sparse accesses during
the first day since the initial leak. From the beginning of the second day, it shows a
sharp increase in accesses to bank sheets and cryptocurrency sheets. Figure 6.6
also shows that accesses to cryptocurrency sheets spanned a longer time period
than accesses to bank sheets — the last access we recorded in a bank sheet was
on the 25th day after first leak, whereas we observed accesses in cryptocurrency
sheets afterwards. Next, we study the modifications that visitors made to some of
the honey sheets.
6.5.4 Modifications and edits in sheets
We observed 38 modifications in 7 cryptocurrency sheets. No bank sheet was mod-
ified. A closer look at the modified sheets revealed that most of the modifications
were recorded when visitors resized columns in sheets (changes made to sheet
structure are recorded as modifications). This happened in cryptocurrency sheets
because visitors wanted to view Bitcoin addresses, which are long strings, partly
obscured in the default states of the cryptocurrency sheets. See Figure 6.3 for an
example cryptocurrency sheet containing Bitcoin addresses — note that the ad-
dresses were not displayed in full. Interested visitors thus had to resize that column
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Figure 6.5: CDF of time lags between first leak and first access. Less than 10% of
the opened sheets were visited within the first 22 hours since first leak, indicating
initial reluctance to visit the sheets. However, accesses increased rapidly afterwards.
By the 25th hour since first leak, 80% of the sheets had been opened.
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Figure 6.6: Timeline of accesses. 98 sheets received 235 accesses. These com-
prise 48 bank sheets (“Bank”) and 50 cryptocurrency sheets (“Bitcoin”). Note that
accesses to cryptocurrency sheets spanned a longer time period than accesses to
bank sheets.
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for a better view.
Next, we studied modifications that resulted in changes to values of cells in
sheets (otherwise known as edits). We observed that a Bitcoin address in cell D4
of a cryptocurrency sheet was replaced with another Bitcoin address. We looked up
the new Bitcoin address on a Bitcoin address verification tool (blockchain.info),
but it returned no result. We also looked up our list of fake Bitcoin addresses to
see if it was copied from another cryptocurrency sheet and this lookup also yielded
no result. This indicates that the Bitcoin address entered by the visitor was either
a yet-to-be-used Bitcoin address that belonged to them (with intent to commit fraud
by receiving payments meant for the original recipient listed on the compromised
sheet), or a fake Bitcoin address made up by them.
In another cryptocurrency sheet, we observed that one of its records (fields B10
– E10) had been replaced with values that were exactly the same record. In other
words, cell edits were recorded with no changes in values. This indicates that a
visitor (accidentally) “cut” the original values and pasted them back in the sheet. On
the same sheet, the next record was modified similarly, with most values intact, ex-
cept for the Bitcoin address field. The Bitcoin address of that record was replaced
with a different string11 that did not fit the specification of Bitcoin addresses and was
also absent from the list of fake Bitcoin addresses we initially generated. We ob-
served another edit in a separate cryptocurrency sheet in which the Bitcoin address
of one of its records was replaced by a copy of the string mentioned previously. This
indicates that the same visitor modified both sheets (by pasting that string in both
sheets).
In summary, the majority of sheet modifications comprised column resizing ac-
tions by visitors, while actual edits involved changes to Bitcoin addresses. Next, we
study the patterns of clicks on honey URLs within the sheets.
11Pasted string — qzpweklwh85u0h2x44ffv4tsfhxww96v8c7kylnwyu. We are yet to figure out what
it stands for.
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6.5.5 Click activity
Recall that we included two types of honey URLs in the honey sheets, namely bank
URLs and cryptocurrency URLs. In this section, we present measurements of clicks
on those URLs. We recorded 219 clicks on honey URLs comprising 135 clicks on
bank URLs and 84 clicks on cryptocurrency URLs. Those clicks originated from 30
countries. We present a detailed summary of click counts in Table 6.3.
Click counts. We wanted to observe differences in clicks on bank URLs and cryp-
tocurrency URLs. To this end, we counted those clicks, by link type, and plotted
CDFs of click counts. Contrary to our expectations, honey URLs of the bank type
consistently received more clicks than honey URLs of the cryptocurrency type. We
expected the opposite to happen, given the recent surge in interest of the general
public in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies. The bank link with the high-
est click count recorded 18 clicks while the cryptocurrency link with the highest click
count recorded 14 counts, as Figure 6.7 shows.
Statistical test. To test the statistical significance of differences in click counts by
link type, we relied on the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to examine the
CDFs in Figure 6.7. The null hypothesis states that both samples under examination
belong to identical statistical distributions. The output of the test is a KS statistic
and p-value. A small KS statistic or high p-value shows that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis. The KS test returned an inconclusive result (statistic=0.4667, p-
value=0.0515).
Click locations. During the analysis of cutt.ly click analytics data (on honey
URLs), we collated a list of countries that clicks originated from. We also carried
out geolocation (country resolution) of IP addresses that visited our bouncy web
server. We used IP-API,12 an IP geolocation service that provides timezone and
location information for IP addresses, to achieve this. We then plotted the resulting
locations, comprising 30 countries, on a world map as shown in Figure 6.8. As the
map shows, most of the countries are located in Europe. It is possible that some
12http://ip-api.com
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Table 6.3: Summary of clicks on honey URLs. Direct honey URLs lead visitors
directly to the destination URL (bank or cryptocurrency page) while bouncy URLs
surreptitiously route visitors through our bouncy web server before redirecting them
to the destination URL. Surprisingly, bank URLs received more clicks than cryptocur-
rency URLs despite the recent interest of the general public in cryptocurrencies and
blockchain technologies.
Type of honey URL Click count
Direct bank 98
Bouncy bank 37
Direct Bitcoin 69
Bouncy Bitcoin 15
Total 219
Figure 6.7: URL click counts. Contrary to our expectations, honey URLs of the bank
type received more clicks than cryptocurrency honey URLs. The bank link with the
highest click count recorded 18 clicks while the cryptocurrency link with the highest
click count recorded 14 counts.
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Figure 6.8: Origins of clicks on honey URLs in sheets. These locations comprise a
comprehensive list of countries found during the parsing of click analytics data and
IP geolocation. Most of the countries are located in Europe. It is possible that some
visitors connected to sheets and clicked on honey URLs via proxies or VPNs.
visitors connected to the sheets and clicked on honey URLs via proxies or VPNs.
We found some TOR exit nodes (see Section 6.5.6) among the IP addresses that
visited the bouncy web server via honey URLs.
The IP geolocation process yielded 20 countries. Intuitively, these countries
should be a subset of the list of countries recorded by the cutt.ly click analytics
tool. However, this was not entirely the case. We found 14 common countries (that
is, they exist in click analytics and IP geolocation datasets), while 6 countries in the
IP geolocation dataset were absent from the click analytics dataset. This shows that
some visitors visited honey URLs, recorded the (de-obfuscated) destination URLs,
and directly visited those destination URLs later.
6.5.6 System configuration of accesses
In this section, we study the devices that visitors used while clicking on honey URLs
in sheets. We discuss their IP addresses, browsers, and operating systems.
IP addresses and TOR exit nodes. Recall that a subset of honey URLs point to
our bouncy web server which allows us to collect IP addresses of visitors clicking
on them, in addition to click analytics. We recorded 35 IP addresses that visited the
bouncy web server from 20 countries. 12 of the IP addresses were TOR exit nodes.
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Figure 6.9: Distribution of browsers that visitors used while clicking on honey URLs
in the sheets. Firefox leads the pack, with more than 80% share in clicks on bank
and cryptocurrency URLs. We also observed clicks from Chrome, Opera, and other
browsers.
Note that this is only a subset of the IP addresses that visited the honey sheets. In
other words, not all visitors to honey sheets click on honey URLs in the sheets. Also,
only a third of our honey URLs, the ones that point to the bouncy web server, can
track IP addresses. Hence we have a partial view of IP addresses. Nevertheless, it
is surprising that 34% of the recorded IP addresses were TOR exit nodes. It shows
that one out of every three persons that visited our honey URLs covered their tracks
while doing so, by visiting via the TOR network.
Browsers. We wanted to understand the distribution of browsers that visitors used
to connect to honey URLs in the sheets. To this end, we extracted browser infor-
mation from click analytics data and grouped browser-clicks by URL type. We com-
puted the percentages of clicks made via the different browsers observed. Figure 6.9
shows the distribution of browsers that were used to visit honey URLs. Visitors that
clicked on honey URLs had an unusual preference for Firefox — the top browser
responsible for more than 80% of clicks on bank and cryptocurrency URLs. We also
observed clicks from Chrome, Opera, and other browsers.
Operating Systems. We wanted to know the operating systems of devices that
connected to honey URLs. We extracted this information from the click analytics
dataset. Visitors that clicked on honey URLs had a preference for Windows de-
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Figure 6.10: Visitors to honey URLs had a preference for Windows devices in clicks
on honey URLs. In Bitcoin URL clicks, even though Windows devices dominate,
we observe a slightly wider range of operating systems compared to bank URLs.
Bitcoin URLs also attract more handheld devices (by percentage share) than bank
URLs, indicating a more diverse set of visitors.
vices, in bank and cryptocurrency honey URL clicks, as shown in Figure 6.10. In
cryptocurrency URL clicks, even though Windows devices dominate, we observe a
slightly wider range of operating systems than devices that clicked on bank URLs. In
both URL types, we observed a small fraction of clicks from Android devices. Cryp-
tocurrency URLs recorded a tiny fraction of visits from iPhones and Linux devices,
both absent from clicks on bank URLs. This indicates that cryptocurrency URLs
attracted a slightly more diverse set of visitors than bank URLs.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the activity of visitors in compromised cloud documents.
First, we presented a method for instrumenting and deploying honey cloud docu-
ments. Next, we deployed 100 payroll sheets comprising 1000 financial records.
In half of the sheets, we included fake banking information, and included fake cryp-
tocurrency information in the other half, to observe differences in accesses and activ-
ity in the sheets. We included honey URLs in the sheets to track clicks on them. We
ran experiments for a month and recorded 235 accesses across 98 sheets. We ob-
served 38 modifications in 7 sheets. Finally, we presented detailed measurements
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and analysis of devices that visited honey URLs, with emphasis on IP addresses,
browsers, and operating systems. In summary, we have presented a comprehensive
picture of what happens to compromised spreadsheets. The findings presented in
this chapter will be useful for other researchers seeking to understand what happens
to stolen cloud documents and providers of cloud services seeking to understand
ways to secure user accounts and assets.
135
Chapter 7
Discussions and Conclusion
In Chapters 4 (webmail accounts), 5 (social accounts), and 6 (cloud documents),
we studied what happens to compromised online accounts and documents. In this
chapter, we position our findings in a broader context. First, we discuss what our
findings imply for current detection and mitigation techniques against malicious ac-
tivity in online accounts. Second, we discuss differences and similarities in activity
across the online services under study. Third, we discuss lessons learned from the
credential dissemination vectors that were employed in this thesis. We then highlight
some implementation-specific limitations of honeypot instances that were deployed
in this thesis. Finally, we present some ideas for future work.
7.1 Implications for detection systems
We made multiple findings that provide the research community with a better un-
derstanding of what happens when online accounts are compromised. In Chapter 4
(webmail accounts), we discovered that attackers that know the locations of web-
mail account owners tend to connect from places that are closer to those locations.
We infer that this is an attempt to evade current security mechanisms employed by
online services to discover suspicious logins. Such systems often rely on the ori-
gin of logins to assess how suspicious those login attempts are. Our findings show
that there is an arms race going on, with attackers attempting to actively evade the
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location-based anomaly detection systems employed by Google and other online
services. We also observed that a considerable number of accesses to webmail ac-
counts, social accounts, and cloud documents were routed through TOR exit nodes,
so it is hard to determine the exact origins of accesses, since TOR network masks
true origins of accesses. This problem shows the necessity of defence-in-depth ap-
proaches in protecting online services, in which multiple layers of detection systems
are deployed simultaneously to identify and block criminals.
Potential improvements. Despite confirming evasion techniques in use by cyber-
criminals, our experiments also highlighted interesting behaviours that can be used
to develop or improve systems to detect malicious activity. For example, our ob-
servations about the words searched for by cybercriminals show that behavioural
modelling could work in identifying anomalous behaviour in online accounts (Chap-
ters 4 and 5). Anomaly detection systems could be trained adaptively on words
being searched for by the legitimate account owner during regular use. A devia-
tion of future search behaviour would then be flagged as anomalous, indicating that
the account may have been compromised. Online service providers, when tuning
detection systems, can also apply our findings on differences in search terms —
in Chapter 4 (webmail accounts), we observed that search terms mostly contained
financial/sensitive information while search terms recorded in Chapter 5 (social ac-
counts) indicated less interest in financial information.1 Similarly, anomaly detection
systems could be trained by building statistical models on the durations of accesses
(measured in Chapters 4 and 5). Deviations from known access patterns could then
be flagged as anomalous (potentially malicious) and they would trigger additional
automatic checks and reviews by human operators. In other words, it is possible
to develop and train tools based on machine learning methods that do not require
balanced training datasets of positive and negative examples (one-class Support
Vector Machines, for instance) on “normal” document activity or account accesses.
Malicious accesses will likely deviate from normal activity and will thus be flagged as
such. Our datasets, collected during experiments, are insufficient for this purpose
1Caveat — We encountered some limitations in our analysis of search terms in Chapter 4.
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(that is, they are not large enough to train machine learning tools). Online services
with direct access to much larger datasets of account accesses and activity, for in-
stance, Google and Facebook, are in a better position to develop such tools.
7.2 Differences across services under study
We observed differences in external usage of honey assets. For instance, in Chap-
ter 4 (webmail accounts), we observed the use of a honey webmail account as a
registration address during account creation on a carding forum (financial usage).
Similarly, in Chapter 5, we observed the use of two honey social accounts for au-
thentication to Instagram (social usage). This shows differences in motivation of cy-
bercriminals that visit different types of online accounts — webmail account visitors
appear to be more interested in financial usage of honey assets than visitors to so-
cial accounts.2 Overall, the use of honey assets on external platforms indicates the
possibility of multi-platform attacks in which cybercriminals compromise accounts on
an online service and use those accounts to carry out further illicit activity on other
services.
As we discussed in Chapter 5 (social accounts), differences in account demo-
graphics influence malicious activity in accounts. For instance, we observed slight
differences in recorded activity across different age ranges and genders. Anomaly
detection systems could be trained to be sensitive to differences in account activity
per demographic attribute. These detection systems could be trained to be more
sensitive to chatty and emotional behaviour in teen accounts more than adult ac-
counts, for instance. Similarly, a related study (not included in this thesis) shows
that language differences in account content affects the behaviour of cybercriminals
in webmail accounts [16]. This knowledge, along with other key findings presented
in this thesis, could be applied when sourcing and partitioning training and test data
for automatic detection systems.
In cloud documents (Chapter 6), we observed differences in document modifi-
2We observed a similar distinction in search terms across webmail and social accounts, as men-
tioned earlier.
138
cations, depending on the content of the documents. Particularly, documents that
contained cryptocurrency information were subject to more modifications than docu-
ments containing banking information, despite receiving fewer accesses than sheets
that contained bank information. Similarly, we observed differences in URL click-
ing behaviour across different types of URLs in documents. This knowledge can
be used during the development and training of detection systems to protect cloud
documents. Such detection systems could be built to adapt their statistical models
depending on document type and content.
7.3 Common trends across services
We also observed common trends across online services. First, we observed some
usage of TOR browser/network in accesses to honey assets in all platforms under
study (webmail, social, and cloud document services). As discussed previously, this
makes it difficult to determine the true origin of accesses to online accounts. Sec-
ond, we recorded account modification or defacement activity on all the platforms
under study. In webmail accounts, for instance, we observed many abandoned
email drafts. In social accounts, we recorded bizarre timeline posts and private
messages. In cloud documents, we observed an instance in which a meaningless
string was pasted in two sheets, among other modifications. Such behaviour likely
deviates from regular everyday use of online accounts and could potentially help in
identifying anomalous behaviour in such accounts.
On a related note, we observed potentially destructive behaviour across all types
of honey assets under study. In webmail and social accounts, for instance, we ob-
served hijacking attacks (password changes) and deletion of friends (along with ad-
dition of new friends). In cloud documents, we observed “cut-and-paste” activity on
sheet content. Recall that there was no way to observe hijacking incidents in cloud
documents because our experimental system intentionally allowed unauthenticated
access to documents. Even though such actions occur during benign account us-
age, a surge in potentially destructive activity could be flagged as an anomaly by
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detection systems.
Finally, we observed search activity in webmail and social honey assets.3 This
shows that searching for information within an account is yet another common ac-
tivity of criminals that connect to stolen accounts on various platforms. This also
corroborates previous work [25] and shows that we should pay more attention to
anomalous search patterns in online accounts in the race for better detection and
mitigation systems to make accounts safer for users.
7.4 Lessons learned from dissemination vectors
Recall that we leveraged multiple dissemination vectors, otherwise known as outlets
for credential leaks, namely paste sites, underground forums, and malware. In this
section, we summarise some general lessons we learned while using those dissem-
ination vectors.
Paste sites and others. During the webmail study (Chapter 4), we leveraged paste
sites and underground forums on the Surface Web and found that paste sites re-
sulted in higher yield than underground forums (we controlled for leak outlets).
Hence, for high yield (more accesses from potential criminals), it is beneficial to
focus more on paste sites than other outlets. Note that we excluded malware leak
outlets from this discussion because they do not fit into the Surface Web/Dark Web
dichotomy.
Surface Web and Dark Web outlets. Unlike Chapter 4 (webmail study) in which we
used Surface Web and malware outlets only, we leveraged a combination of Surface
and Dark Web outlets (paste sites) in Chapters 5 (social accounts) and 6 (cloud
documents). This combination of Surface Web and Dark Web outlets enabled us to
record more accesses than we would have recorded if we had relied on the Surface
Web only. This approach also helps to improve the diversity of visitors (potential
criminals) that access honey assets.
3Even though sheets present search functionality, we do not have a way to record search logs in
them yet.
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Malware outlets. It takes a skilled criminal with malicious intent to operate information-
stealing malware infrastructure. The process extends beyond mere curiosity, for in-
stance, just testing to see if leaked accounts are real or not – it involves actively
compromising victim endpoint devices and covertly stealing sensitive information
from them. Hence, when compared to paste sites and underground forums that
attract a combination of potentially benign visitors, potential criminals, and other in-
terested parties, malware outlets comprise dissemination vectors that are founded
on real criminal intent and they likely provide the “purest” view to malicious activity
in online accounts. Hence, it may be beneficial to focus more on malware outlets
in future work seeking to understand sophisticated cybercriminal operations. How-
ever, the main downside of studying malware outlets is the difficulty of obtaining
live malware samples with active C&C infrastructure (malware outlets are fickle, as
we learned during the webmail study). In addition, advanced information-stealing
malware, for instance Dridex, often incorporate evasive mechanisms that prevent
them from executing in sandboxed environments. Despite these challenges, mal-
ware outlets hold a lot of promise in shining light on criminal activity in compromised
accounts.
7.5 Implementation-specific limitations
In Chapter 3, we discussed our honey assets method, ARMER requirements for hon-
eypots, and our honeypot development life cycle approach. We also discussed its
limitations. In this section, we discuss the limitations of specific honeypot instances
that were deployed during the experiments in this thesis.
We were able to leak honey assets on a few outlets, namely paste sites, under-
ground forums, and malware. In particular, we could only target underground forums
that were open to the public and for which registration was free. In Chapter 4 (web-
mail accounts), we could not study recent families of information-stealing malware,
such as Dridex, because they would not execute in our virtual environment (evasive
malware). Attackers could find the scripts we hid in the webmail accounts and re-
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move them, and make it impossible for us to monitor their activity. This is an intrinsic
limitation of the webmail honeypot infrastructure, but this limitation does not apply to
the Facebook honeypot system in Chapter 5, since we did not have to hide scripts
in Facebook accounts. In principle, studies similar to ours could be performed by
online service providers themselves, for instance, Google or Facebook. By having
access to the full logs of their systems, such entities would have no need to set up
monitoring scripts and it would be impossible for attackers to evade their scrutiny.
Chapter 4 revealed that the vast majority of accesses to our webmail accounts,
especially the ones leaked via underground forums and malware, resulted in no
action (“curious” visitors). Our honey accounts were possibly not convincing enough
for them to take action after logging in. This can affect the ecological validity of our
findings. Alternatively, it is possible that potential criminals that use underground
forums and malware are generally less active than those that use paste sites.
In Chapter 4 (webmail accounts), while evaluating what cybercriminals were
looking for in honey accounts, we were able to observe the emails that they were
interested in, not everything they searched for. This happened because we did
not have access to search logs of the webmail accounts under study. However, in
Chapter 5 (social accounts), we did not face this limitation. We had access to the
full search logs of Facebook accounts that were deployed during experiments and
recorded exact search terms in them.
In Chapter 6, we had limited visibility into the sheets because of unauthenti-
cated accesses (by design). As a result, we were able to record only a subset of IP
addresses that visited the documents by recording the ones that clicked on honey
URLs in the documents. Similarly, we succeeded in recording times of accesses
to cloud documents, but not the durations of accesses, unlike Chapters 4 (webmail
accounts) and Chapter 5 (social accounts) in which we recorded access durations,
in addition to IP addresses.
Across all services under study, we leaked credentials via public outlets, with the
exception of the subset of webmail credentials that were leaked through information-
stealing malware, implying that they ended up in private lists of the actors running
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those malware C&C servers. In other words, all public leaks, by design, were known
to multiple potential criminals simultaneously. There is the possibility that the acces-
sibility of credentials to multiple potential criminals diminished the perceived value
of those accounts. This may influence their willingness to carry out the usual ac-
tions they would have carried out if the accounts were privately held. In view of this,
the subset of webmail credentials that were leaked via malware likely present better
ecological validity (since they were privately held) than the remaining sets of leaked
credentials.
Finally, recall that we do not have control of the online services that host our
honey assets. Hence, the installation of scripts inside honey assets that require
them (see Chapters 4 and 6) must be done perfectly prior to experiments. This is
because it is hard to update scripts in honey assets — such updates must be carried
out and tested manually across all honey assets. This is hard to do, but even harder
once experiments are in motion (such updates, if carried out during experiments,
may taint the findings). Hence, we carried out rigorous testing on honey assets prior
to experiments to avoid having to update them during experiments.
Despite these limitations, we have succeeded in shedding light on malicious
activity in online accounts and cloud documents. Our honeypots also provide new
ways for researchers and service providers to carry out related work and add to the
knowledge of the security community.
7.6 Future work
In the future, we plan to continue exploring the ecosystem of stolen accounts and
gaining a better understanding of the underground economy surrounding them. We
will explore ways to make honey assets more believable, to attract more cybercrim-
inals and keep them engaged. We intend to set up additional scenarios, such as
studying attackers who have a specific motivation, for example, compromising ac-
counts that belong to political activists. We also intend to carry out further studies on
the impact of other demographic attributes (including employment status, religious
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affiliation, and political affiliation, among others) of online accounts on the behaviour
of cybercriminals that gain illicit access to them. It is also possible to deploy social
honeypots to understand demographic risk factors that influence cyberbullying in-
cidents. These will provide comprehensive insights into attackers’ motivations and
resulting activity.
7.7 Conclusion
In this thesis, we reviewed existing work on malicious online activity, developed novel
methods to study malicious activity in compromised online accounts, carried out ex-
periments, and presented our findings. We discovered attempts by cybercriminals
to evade existing defence systems. We also observed patterns of accesses and be-
haviour that could be used to characterise malicious activity to help improve existing
defence systems. We discussed the implications of our findings, especially for online
service providers, and bridged the research gap we observed prior to the work in
this thesis. Finally, we discussed the limitations of our work and highlighted potential
future work. Parts of the work in this thesis have been peer-reviewed and presented
in top conferences and workshops. In addition, some parts have received consid-
erable press coverage. This shows that our work has contributed to the research
community and increased the awareness of the general public about compromised
online accounts. Overall, this will lead to safer online activity for everyone.
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